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IN WORDS OF THE PANDEMIC, ARBITRATION
JURISPRUDENCE NEEDS A VENTILATOR
By Bartholomew L. McLeay1
INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic and arbitration share a few chronic symptoms. There are
conflicting opinions about the standards for governing rulemaking, a debate on whether state
policy or federal authority should control, and questions about the jurisdiction and neutrality of
decisionmakers responsible for providing solutions. For those seeking review of an arbitration
award today, like the current health environment, the situation is disconcerting. No herd
immunity or PPE exists to protect challengers against the legal contagion spreading through the
arbitration review process.
The United States has become “arbitration nation.”2 Some arbitrations have become
so complex and litigation-like that they amount to commercial litigation masquerading as
arbitration. Late Justice Antonin Scalia observed those arbitrations are not envisioned by the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)3 and may not be required under state law.4 The United States
Supreme Court needs to flatten the curve and create a new normal by removing the pariah
treatment associated with those who challenge arbitration awards. It should act with Operation
Warp Speed.
Lower courts have tried to distill a few homemade elixirs,5 but major infirmities in
arbitration jurisprudence remain for which only the United States Supreme Court can provide
the cure, and some ailments show signs of need for critical care.
There are sharply conflicting standards of review for determining “evident partiality”
of an arbitrator under the FAA.6 There also is a recognized split in the lower courts over whether
a challenging party must have knowledge of the specific underlying conflict of an arbitrator
1

Mr. McLeay is a 36-year litigation attorney with Kutak Rock LLP, based in Omaha. Mr. McLeay is a proud
member of the Nebraska State Bar Association and is admitted in Nebraska and other courts. Any opinion here
is his own.
2
Aspic Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. ECC Centcom Constructors LLC, 913 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2019).
3
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
4
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344, 351 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he point of
affording parties discretion in designing arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures . . .
Parties could agree to arbitrate pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or . . . process rivaling that in
litigation. . . . But . . . [that] is not arbitration as envisioned by the FAA . . . [and] may not be required by state
law”).
5
See, e.g., Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Fund, 748 F.2d 79, 83–84 (2d Cir.
1984) (“Against this murky backdrop of Supreme Court precedent, we examine prior decisions in this circuit…
In attempting to delineate standards of impartiality on a relatively clean slate, we are struck by the competing
interests inherent in the use of arbitration”); Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he
majority [in Commonwealth Coatings] did not articulate a succinct standard [but] ‘[r]easonable impression of
partiality,’ . . . is the best expression of the Commonwealth Coatings court’s holding”).
6
9 U.S.C.§ 10(a)(2) (“court … may make an order vacating the award … where there was evident partiality …
in the arbitrators”); UBS Fin. Servs. v. Asociación de Empleados del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, 997
F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2021) (citing authority “describing the circuit split in the wake of” Commonwealth Coatings
Corp. v. Cont’l. Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145(1968)).
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before it is found to have waived the conflict.7 There is further an entrenched divide in the lower
courts regarding whether an arbitration award may be vacated under the FAA if it is found to
have been made in “manifest disregard of the law”8 or, separately, in violation of a dominant
state public policy.9 There is still further a widespread discord in the lower courts concerning
an important jurisdictional issue: whether an interim arbitration award is subject to immediate
court review.10
The potential for misdiagnosis in the lower courts on the wrong side of these court
splits, especially as it relates to arbitrator neutrality, presents a worrisome prognosis not only
for arbitration, but for the judiciary as well.11 This is not a hallucinatory reaction. Arbitration
nation continues to grow and is rapidly moving toward becoming the only civil justice system
the public truly knows.12 As the public discovers that arbitrators can with impunity make awards
implicating their own interests, or manifestly disregard the law or ignore dominant public
policies of the forum that judges cannot, the threat of a systemic loss of confidence in the justice
system could become a reality. At the very far extreme, the Supreme Court’s intervention is
needed to avoid a future where people conclude the best medicine for legal ills may be found
by administering doses of street justice they can prescribe for themselves.
This article first concludes the reasonable impression of bias standard based on the
majority opinion in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont. Cas. Co.13 for determining
“evident partiality” should be reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. As discussed herein, this
standard should be strictly applied particularly when an arbitrator fails to disclose a personal
ownership or financial interest related to the arbitration.
Second, this article concludes waiver of “evident partiality” should not be found in a
case where an arbitrator has a personal ownership or financial interest in the arbitration unless
the challenging party has actual knowledge of the specific conflict and the arbitrator has
complied with any applicable law requiring written consent from the parties.

7

See, e.g., Shaffer v. Priority One Bank, No. 3:15-CV-304-HTW-LGI, 2021 WL 2386824, at *10 (S.D. Miss.
June 10, 2021) (“Federal Circuits are split as to whether a complaining party must have had actual knowledge of
the underlying conflict before waiving its right to assert the conflict”).
8
Luciano v. Tchrs. Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am., No. 15-6726, 2021 WL 1663712, at *2, n.2 (D.N.J. Apr. 28,
2021) (“Since [Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008)], a circuit split has emerged
regarding the manifest disregard of the law doctrine . . . .”) (citations omitted).
9
Caputo v. Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC, 2020 WL 2786934, at *3 (D.N.J. May 29, 2020) (“[T]he Circuit Courts
of Appeals have . . . disagreed on whether the public policy exception continues to serve as cognizable means for
challenging an arbitration award”).
10
La. Health Serv. Indem. Co. v. DVA Renal Healthcare, Inc., 422 F. App’x 313, 314, n.1 (5th Cir. 2011)
(referring to a “partial final” award, stating “[w]e note that a circuit split exists as to whether federal courts may
hear an interlocutory appeal from an arbitral tribunal”).
11
Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984)
(“[T]he statutory scheme we examine today implicates the process of the federal courts in the enforcement of
‘private’ remedies. Were we to lend our imprimatur to an award grounded in fraud or bias, the sense of fairness
that society rightfully demands of its judiciary would be sadly diminished”).
12
See Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 207 L.
Ed. 2d 1100 (2020) (noting in a case with “two sophisticated companies, the proliferation of arbitration clauses
in everyday life—including in employment-related disputes, consumer transactions, housing issues, and
beyond[.]”).
13
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l. Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968) (“[A]ny tribunal permitted by
law to try cases and controversies not only must be unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance of bias[.]”).
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Third, this article concludes a court should be authorized in rare and exceptional
circumstances to vacate at least that part of an arbitration award governed by the FAA made in
clear “manifest disregard of the law” or in violation of an explicit, well-defined and dominant
public policy.
Fourth, this article recognizes any attempt by parties to definitively decide by
agreement when a court has appellate jurisdiction to consider an interim or non-final award is
a legal nullity. But there is wooziness in the lower courts in applying this basic principle to
arbitration awards. The Supreme Court should treat this jurisdictional disorder, and place it in
permanent remission, by promulgating a simple rule discussed herein.
Finally, this article discusses at length a recent Nebraska Supreme Court decision,
Seldin v. Estate of Silverman,14 in which each of the arbitration “variants” discussed above15
are helpfully quarantined in a single opinion. Seldin is an excellent case for autopsy because it
reveals the difficulty and confusion for litigants and courts alike in tracking and monitoring the
viral transmission of numerous conflicts in arbitration jurisprudence. Seldin also demonstrates
the harsh sequalae imposed on arbitration challengers forced to shoulder the impact of
incompatible arbitration rules while patiently awaiting the Supreme Court’s development of an
arbitral vaccine in an appropriate case. Until remedied, a contract party’s decision to pursue
arbitration will remain a risky Queen’s Gambit.16
Evident Partiality Is Shown by Arbitrator’s Personal Ownership or Financial Interest
A.

Any Interest “Influencing the Conduct” of Adjudicator

In the majority opinion in Commonwealth Coatings, the Supreme Court found lower
courts “should, if anything, be even more scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators
than judges, since the former have completely free rein to decide the law as well the facts and
are not subject to appellate review.”17
Commonwealth Coatings involved a subcontractor who brought an action against
sureties under a prime contractor bond to recover money allegedly due for a painting job. 18 The
contract required the parties to submit the dispute to arbitration. The arbitration panel consisted
of three arbitrators, one selected by each party, and the third jointly selected. The third arbitrator
14

See generally Seldin v. Est. of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185, 939 N.W.2d 768 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct.
2622, 209 L. Ed. 2d 751 (2021). There were multiple related parties and law firms involved in this action. This
author appeared on behalf of Scott A. Seldin (defined herein as “Scott”) in his individual capacity and limited to
post-arbitration proceedings only.
15
There is yet another issue subject to circuit split, also identified in Seldin, whether a court can modify an award
based on review of the arbitration record as a whole or, instead, whether its review is limited to errors found on
the face of the award. Id., 305 Neb. at 215, 939 N.W.2d at 792. See also John B. Rich, J., Arbitrator’s Error and
the “Face of the Award” Rule, 24 J. CONS. & COMMC’N. L. 49 (2021) (noting “widening [of] the split in the
circuits”).
16
Queen’s Gambit is a popular opening chess move that sacrifices a pawn to gain a better control of the center
of the board. The Queen’s Gambit, SIMPLIFY CHESS, https://simplifychess.com/queens-gambit (last visited Aug.
22, 2021). The Queen’s Gambit was the most watched scripted series on Netflix during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Todd Spangler, ‘The Queen’s Gambit’ Scores as Netflix Most-Watched Scripted Limited Series to Date, VARIETY
(Nov. 23, 2020), https://variety.com/2020/digital/news/queens-gambit-netflix-viewing-record-1234838090.
17
Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 149.
18
Id. at 146.
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had a substantial business relationship with the prime contractor, including “rendering of
services on the very projects involved in this lawsuit.”19 Those facts were not disclosed by the
third arbitrator and were unknown to the subcontractor until after the award. 20
Justice Black led a six-Justice majority in Commonwealth Coatings that interpreted
the phrase “evident partiality” to impose a “simple requirement” that “arbitrators disclose to
the parties any dealings that might create an impression of possible bias.” 21 This standard
aligned with public expectations for judges because it “rest[s] on the premise that any tribunal
permitted by law to try cases and controversies not only must be unbiased but also must avoid
even the appearance of bias.”22
Justice White, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote a concurrence stating he was “glad
to join” Justice Black’s majority opinion.23 Despite clear language in the majority opinion
equating the neutrality of arbitrators to judges and adoption of an “impression of bias” standard,
Justice White commented he did not read it to “decide” that “arbitrators are to be held to the
standards of judicial decorum of Article III judges, or indeed of any judges.”24 Although Justice
White also found “evident partiality” did not mean actual bias, he did not articulate a standard
different than “reasonable impression of partiality” to be applied under the FAA.25
The interplay between Commonwealth Coatings’ majority opinion and Justice
White’s concurring opinion has led to a longstanding, “intractable judicial division”26 and halfcentury split in the courts over the proper standard of review for “evident partiality” of an
arbitrator, with courts on one side of the divide applying a “reasonable impression of bias”

19

Id.
Id.
21
Id. at 148–49.
22
Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150 (emphasis added); see also id. at 148.
23
Id. at 150 (White, J., concurring).
24
Id.
25
None of the Justices in Commonwealth Coatings found the arbitrator guilty of actual bias. Justice Black found
“[P]etitioner does not charge . . . the . . . arbitrator was actually guilty of . . . bias in deciding this case” and “we
have no reason . . . to suspect him of any improper motives.” Id. at 147. Justice White, concurring, did not add
anything on this point. Id. at 150. “The Court sets aside the arbitration award despite . . . no claim . . . of actual
partiality, unfairness, bias, or fraud.” Id. at 152. (Fortas, J., dissenting).
26
Edward C. Dawson, Speak Now or Hold Your Peace: Prearbitration Express Waivers of Evident-Partiality
Challenges, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 307, 324 (2013).
20
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standard27 and the courts on the other side of the split applying what is referred to here as the
“have to conclude” standard.28 They are demonstrably different.29
In support of the majority opinion, Justice Black cited Tumey v. State of Ohio,30 in
which the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a defendant because the ruling judge’s
compensation included court fees and costs derived from convicted defendants. 31 Tumey
explained, applying constitutional standards: “[n]o matter what the evidence was against him,
he had the right to have an impartial judge.”32 Tumey further intimated “[e]very procedure”33
in a legal proceeding may be evaluated when it comes to the neutrality of an adjudicator. 34
In other settings, the Supreme Court has explained any “interest” potentially
“influencing the conduct” of an adjudicator is disqualifying even under heightened
constitutional standards.35 Notably, there is no requirement, even under a constitutional
challenge, to demonstrate an adjudicator is “in fact . . . influenced,” only to show “whether
sitting on the case . . . ‘would offer a possible temptation to the average . . . judge to . . . lead

27

Four courts—the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, as well as the highest courts of Alabama and Texas—have
employed standards in conformity with Justice Black’s majority opinion. These courts have held evident partiality
is found when an arbitrator fails to disclose a fact or circumstance that gives rise to a “reasonable impression of
partiality” or “reasonable impression of bias.” See, e.g., Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 1994);
Univ. Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal Constructors Inc., 304 F.3d 1331, 1339 (11th Cir. 2002); see also
Mun. Workers Comp. Fund, Inc. v. Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc., 190 So. 3d 895, 915–16 (Ala. 2015); Burlington
N. R.R. Co. v. TUCO Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex. 1997); Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy,
LLC, 437 S.W.3d 518, 525, 527 (Tex. 2014).
28
Six federal courts of appeals, and the Nebraska Supreme Court, have rejected the Commonwealth Coatings
majority’s analysis and instead applied a heightened standard, which purportedly is derived from Justice White’s
concurrence that requires a party seeking vacatur of an award to show “a reasonable person would have to
conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration.” Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist.
Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984); see also UBS Fin. Servs. v. Asociación de
Empleados del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, 997 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2021); Freeman v. Pittsburgh
Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 253 (3d Cir. 2013); ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493,
500 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 877 (1999); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429 F.3d
640, 645 (6th Cir. 2005); Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1009 (1983); Seldin v. Est. of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185, 204 n.30, 939 N.W.2d 768, 785 (2020), cert.
denied, 141 S.Ct. 2622, 209 L. Ed. 2d 751 (2021).
29
The “reasonable impression of partiality” standard “is much broader” than the “have to conclude” standard
because “circumstances can convey an impression of partiality without necessarily dictating a conclusion of
partiality.” Burlington N. R.R. Co., 960 S.W.2d at 633–34; see also Morelite Constr. Corp, 748 F.2d at 83–84
(“[W]e read Section 10(b) as requiring a showing of something more than the mere ‘appearance of bias’ to vacate
an arbitration award”). In practice, the “have to conclude” standard appears to effectively demand a showing of
actual bias, although Justice White did not purport to go that far. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l.
Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
30
Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927).
31
See id. at 535.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 532 (“Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge . . . which
might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter
due process of law”).
34
Justice White likewise stated the Justices could not “overlook” unacceptable conduct because “that would be
an abdication” of responsibility, adding the “arbitration process functions best when an amicable and trusting
atmosphere is preserved.” Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150-51.
35
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986); see Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 150.
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him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.’”36 The failure of an adjudicator to adequately
disclose the intensity of his or her reaction to a personal dilemma related to a case under
review37 also is disqualifying.38
B.

Arbitrator’s Ongoing Obligation to Make Disclosures

Arbitrators are required to “take steps to ensure that the parties are not misled into
believing that no nontrivial conflict exists.”39 An arbitrator has “an ongoing obligation” to make
disclosures even during arbitration and, once an arbitrator is aware “a nontrivial conflict of
interest might exist,” the “calculus change[s],” especially if the arbitrator has “assured the
parties that he intended” to have further contact if such an event occurred.40 If an arbitrator
delays disclosure to the point that, given the amount already invested in the proceeding, it is
not practical for a party to object, a court may decide the late disclosure was insufficient and
justifies vacation of the award.41 The failure to disclose alone can establish “evident
partiality.”42
When an arbitrator has a “personal stake” on an arbitral issue in an ongoing
arbitration, the arbitrator is prohibited from making a ruling on the issue and the challenging

36

Caperton v. AT Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 878, 879 (2009) (noting “more general concept of interests
that tempt adjudicators to disregard neutrality[.]”).
37
United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 747 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding disqualification where “the judge did not
reveal . . . [timely] the intensity of his personal reaction to the dilemma[.]”).
38
28 U.S.C. § 455(b); Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1527 n.18 (11th Cir. 1988) (“Grounds for
disqualification under § 455(b) cannot be waived by the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(e)”). The Supreme Court
has strictly applied this federal law to “require[] disqualification . . . regardless of whether or not the interest
actually creates an appearance of impropriety”); see also Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S.
847, 859, n.8 (1988) (applying 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) and (d)(4)).
39
Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2007).
40
Id. at 138–39.
41
Univ. Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal Constructors, Inc., 304 F.3d 1331, 1336, 1344 (11th Cir. 2002)
(“An arbitrator must disclose a potential conflict as soon as it becomes apparent; otherwise, delay and
concealment would be encouraged. . . . [If an arbitrator] delayed . . . disclosure . . . to the point that, given the
amount . . . invested in the proceeding, . . . [it was] not . . . practical . . . to object . . ., then the court may well
decide [the] disclosure was insufficient to avoid vacatur”) (citations omitted).
42
Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2007)
(“A reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator who failed to disclose under [required]
circumstances was partial to one side”); see also Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC, 437
S.W.3d 518, 525, 527 (Tex. 2014) “[T]he standard for evident partiality in Commonwealth Coatings . . . requires
vacating an award if an arbitrator fails to disclose facts which might, to an objective observer, create a reasonable
impression of the arbitrator’s partiality” and “evident partiality is established from the nondisclosure itself”).
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party is not required to establish the arbitrator showed any actual or apparent bias. 43 When a
“personal stake” is involved, the risk of unfairness is so inconsistent with basic principles of
justice that the arbitration award should be automatically vacated. 44
The Supreme Court has made this point in other contexts. For example, in NLRB v.
Amax Coal Co., the Court found a fiduciary with conflicting interests cannot serve two “masters
equally well” or rationalize a difference in loyalty owed to both. 45
C.

Federalism and Role of State Law in Disqualification of Neutral

The Supreme Court has observed disqualification of an adjudicator 46 is often based
on failing to meet statutory requirements rather than constitutional violations.47 It further has
noted, as a general rule, any person acting in a quasi-judicial capacity must be disqualified from
overseeing a tribunal if he or she has an interest in the controversy to be decided. 48 It still further
has found a non-judge acting under statutory authority to adjudicate a dispute must
affirmatively demonstrate an “appearance of justice.”49 Finally, it has explained in another

43

Pitta v. Hotel Ass’n of N.Y.C., Inc., 806 F.2d 419, 420 (2d Cir. 1986), demonstrates a “rarely litigated”
circumstance of evident partiality. In Pitta, plaintiff and defendant disputed whether an assigned arbitrator could
be dismissed by one of the parties acting alone and further whether the arbitrator could rule on the dismissal
provisions under the agreement. Id. at 421. On appeal from a district court ruling against defendant, the Second
Circuit found the issue was arbitral, but that “evident partiality” prevented the arbitrator from deciding the issue
because he had a “personal stake” in the matter. Id. at 423–24. The Second Circuit found:
In assessing “evident partiality,” we need not inquire into whether . . . [the arbitrator] showed actual
rather than merely apparent bias. The relationship between a party and the arbitrator may, in some
circumstances, create a risk of unfairness so inconsistent with basic principles of justice that the
arbitration award must be automatically vacated.
Id. at 423–24.
44
Id.
45
NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329–30 (1981) (quoting Woods v. City Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of
Chi.. 312 U.S. 262, 269 (1941) (“A fiduciary cannot contend ‘that, although he had conflicting interests, he served
his masters equally well or that his primary loyalty was not weakened by the pull of his secondary one’”)); see
also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 526 n.6 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
46
Several states impose judicial ethical rules on arbitrators by statute. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2604.01
(1997) (arbitrators are subject to disqualification on same grounds as judges); accord CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1281.9(a) (West 1994) (requiring arbitrators to “disclose all matters that could cause a person aware of the facts
to reasonably entertain a doubt” as to their impartiality, including “[t]he existence of any ground specified in . . .
[California law] for disqualification of a judge”); see also MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-116(3)-(4) (2009)
(disclosure to the extent of “any ground . . . for disqualification of a judge”).
47
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820–21 (1986) (“The more recent trend has been towards the
adoption of statutes that permit disqualification for bias or prejudice”). In contrast to disqualification under
federal or state statutes, the Supreme Court has determined there is a higher constitutional standard, stating it
“decline[s] to read Tumey, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927) as constitutionalizing any rule that a decision rendered by a
judge with ‘the slightest pecuniary interest’ constitutes a violation of the Due Process Clause.” Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 475 U.S. at 825 n.3 (emphasis added).
48
“That officers acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity are disqualified by their interest in the controversy
to be decided is, of course, the general rule.” Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension
Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 522).
49
Tumey, 273 U.S. at 522; see also Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 618 (quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S.
238, 243 (1980)) (“‘[J]ustice,’ indeed, ‘must satisfy the appearance of justice’ . . . This, too, is no less true where
a private party is given statutory authority to adjudicate a dispute . . . .”).
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context there are “fundamental arbitration questions” in which “consent” must be explicit and
may not be inferred by the parties.50
FAA procedural rules do not govern review of an arbitration award in state court.51
Indeed, the FAA specifically refers to review only by a “United States court.”52 In Hall Street
Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,53 the Supreme Court explained requests to vacate or modify
an award under “§§ 10 and 11 . . . do not . . . exclude more searching review based on authority
outside the [FAA] statute as well,” adding the FAA is “not the only way into court for parties
wanting review of arbitration awards: they may contemplate enforcement under state statutory
or common law.”54 State supreme courts have adopted this view.55 The FAA and state law
arbitration rules both have been found to apply in a state court action. 56
While recognizing that policies applicable in the context of judicial recusal may be
different than those applicable to arbitrator disclosure, 57 courts have rejected the contention that
a written disclosure requirement under a state statute relating to arbitrators “violates the purpose
of the FAA by allowing a party to seize upon a technicality” to vacate an arbitration award. 58
State courts also have expressly held that state statutory judicial ethical standards apply to
arbitrators.59

50
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 (2019) (noting “refusal to infer consent when it comes to . . .
fundamental arbitration questions”).
51
See, e.g., Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 597 (Cal. 2008) (quoting Cronus Invs., Inc.
v. Concierge Servs., 107 P.3d 217, 226 (Cal. 2005) (“‘[T]he United States Supreme Court does not read the
FAA’s procedural provisions to apply to state court proceedings’”); see also Kindred Nursing Ctrs., Ltd. v. Clark,
137 S. Ct. 1421, 1429 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (FAA “does not apply to proceedings in state courts”).
52
9 U.S.C. § 10.
53
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
54
Id. at 590.
55
Cable Connection, 190 P.3d 586 at 597, 599 (“‘[T]he United States Supreme Court[’s] . . . interpretation of
sections 10 and 11 of the FAA does not preclude other grounds for review”) (quoting Cronus Invs., 107 P.3d 217
at 226); Finn v. Ballentine Partners, LLC, 143 A.3d 859, 871-72 (N.H. 2016) (“Hall Street was a question of
statutory interpretation, not preemption. . . . It considered only federal law as it applied to a federal court”).
56
Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 97 n.64, 98 (Tex. 2011) (“The TAA and the FAA may both be
applicable to an agreement, absent the parties’ choice . . . For the FAA to preempt . . ., state law must refuse to
enforce an arbitration agreement that the FAA would enforce . . . .”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see
also Masseau v. Luck, 252 A.3d 788, 801, 803-04 (Vt. 2021) (Reiber, C.J., concurring) (“FAA was enacted as a
procedural statute . . . [and] contains no express pre-emptive provision . . . The result [here] is inconsistent with
principles of federalism . . . .”). Parties may affirmatively agree the FAA applies in a state proceeding. See
Wyatt v. Own a Car of Fresno, No. F075692, 2019 WL 698017, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2019).
57
See, e.g., Haworth v. Super. Ct., 235 P.3d 152, 163, 166 (Cal. 2010) (“[T]he standard for disclosure by a
neutral arbitrator . . . is the same as the standard for disqualification of a judge . . . . Clearly, [however,] some of
the policies applicable in the context of judicial recusal may differ from those applicable to arbitrator disclosure”).
58
See, e.g., Ovitz v. Schulman, 133 Cal. App. 4th 830, 853, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 127, 134 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
(rejecting argument that written disclosure of arbitrator required by state law “violates the purpose of the FAA
because it ‘undermines the entire arbitration process, allowing a party to seize upon a technicality to vacate an
arbitration award’”).
59
See, e.g., Haworth, 235 P.3d at 163 (“[T]he standard for disclosure by a neutral arbitrator . . . is the same as
the standard for disqualification of a judge”); State v. Pattno, 254 Neb. 733, 739, 579 N.W.2d 503, 507 (1998)
(noting “judges and arbitrators . . . [are] subject to the same ethical standards”); cf. Meso Scale Diagnostics,
LLC. v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, 247 A.3d 229, 243, 243 n.60 (Del. 2021) (noting “rules of judicial ethics”
apply to “other types of adjudicators”).
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Written Waiver Should Be Strictly Required for Arbitrator Personal Ownership
Interest
A.

Ownership Is Crucial Fact

The Supreme Court in Commonwealth Coatings noted the arbitrator’s relationship
with a party included “the very projects involved in this lawsuit,” which the arbitrator had not
“revealed” until after the award was made.60 Commonwealth Coatings found “highly
significant” an arbitration rule that requires a “writing” from both parties to “waive”
circumstances likely to create a presumption of bias or that might disqualify the arbitrator.61
The decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Monster
Energy Co. v. City Beverages62 highlights the significant differences between the standards for
“evident partiality” in lower courts and waiver of any objection to same. 63 In Monster Energy,
two “sophisticated companies,” a supplier and a distributor of beverage products, arbitrated a
dispute before a JAMS arbitrator who fully disclosed to all parties he had “an economic interest
in the overall financial success of JAMS” and further informed the distributor that JAMS
previously had “participated in” a dispute resolution proceeding with the supplier. 64
Neither party objected to the arbitrator’s disclosures. After an award was made in
favor of the supplier, the distributor obtained additional information about the arbitrator and
sought to vacate the award for “evident partiality” under the FAA. 65 The distributor explained
it learned only after the final award that the arbitrator had a personal “ownership” interest in
JAMS beyond his economic interest in an official capacity as a JAMS arbitrator. 66
The district court rejected the distributor’s challenge, finding, among other things, the
distributor had “waived its evident partiality claim because . . . the [a]rbitrator disclosed his
economic interest.”67 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and vacated the award, finding the
arbitrator’s statement concerning his “economic interest in the overall financial success of
JAMS” was insufficient to reveal “his ownership interest” individually in JAMS.68 Applying
the reasonable impression of bias standard of review, the Ninth Circuit found the arbitrator’s
“partial disclosure” did not constitute waiver as “constructive knowledge”69 because the
60

Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 146 (1968).
Id. at 146.
62
Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct 164 (2020).
63
Heather Cameron, Blind Justice and Just Arbitrators: Understanding the Federal Arbitration Act’s Evident
Partiality Standard, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 2233, 2243-44 (2021) (noting “[a] [b]lack and [w]hite [c]ircuit
[s]plit[] . . . has developed over how to interpret Commonwealth Coatings . . . [and] Monster Energy” and also
“highlight[ing] the significant differences between the standards”).
64
Monster Energy, 940 F.3d at 1132–33, 1137.
65
Id. at 1133, 1137.
66
Id. at 1136.
67
Id. at 1134.
68
Id. at 1133-37.
69
Monster Energy, 940 F.3d at 1134 (citing Fidelity Fed. Bank, FSB v. Durga Ma Corp., 386 F.3d 1306, 1313
(9th Cir. 2004) (holding “waiver doctrine applies where a party to an arbitration has constructive knowledge of
a potential conflict but fails to timely object”); see also Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Athena Venture Partners, L.P.,
803 F.3d 144, 148 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Constructive Knowledge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)
(“Constructive knowledge is defined as the ‘[k]nowledge that one using reasonable care or diligence should have,
and therefore that is attributed by law to a given person’”)).
61
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arbitrator’s individual “ownership interest” in JAMS was “[t]he crucial fact,” and it was not
known until after the final award.70
B.

Undisclosed Personal “Connection” to Party Is Disqualifying

In Shaffer v. PriorityOne Bank,71 a bankruptcy trustee for husband-wife debtors and
a state bank arbitrated disputes relating to eighteen loans. Following the bankruptcy, the bank
foreclosed on the property and the trustee filed an action, later stayed for arbitration, seeking to
recover “surplus” allegedly held by the bank beyond its collateral, and for wrongful foreclosure.
The arbitrator entered an award in favor of the bankruptcy trustee of $2,711,813.33. 72
Before the arbitration, the arbitrator represented in a notice of appointment that he did
not have “any connections, direct or indirect, with any of the case participants,” but later stated
he had forgotten, and thus omitted, he had previously provided a third-party guaranty for a
commercial property developer on an unrelated loan.73 That loan was refinanced with another
financial institution when it “became due” before the arbitration award was entered and it was
paid by the developer without any known involvement of the arbitrator. 74 After the arbitration,
the bank moved to vacate the award on the ground the arbitrator “failed to make complete
disclosures.” During post-arbitration proceedings, the arbitrator testified he “never had the first
thought that [he] had any relationship with” the bank and that “he would have disclosed the
guaranty ‘[h]ad it come to [his] mind that th[e] guaranty was out there.’” 75 The arbitrator
emphatically “testified that his financial relationship with the Bank ‘would have [had] no
impact on [his] neutrality, independence, or impartiality.’”76
Applying the “reasonable impression of bias” standard,77 the district court in Shaffer
found the bank “me[t] its burden of showing ‘evident partiality’” of the arbitrator based on his
“connection” with the bank.78 But the district court refused to vacate the award because it found
the bankruptcy trustee had shown the bank had at least “constructive knowledge” the arbitrator
70

Monster Energy, 940 F.3d at 1135. A similar result also was reached in Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa
Pine Energy, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 518, 527 (Tex. 2014) (quoting Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas.
Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)) (noting arbitrator’s ownership interest alone may create an appearance of partiality
since it is contrary to the Supreme Court’s “directive to be ‘scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators’
in a process not subject to appellate review”).
71
Shaffer v. PriorityOne Bank, No. 3:15-CV-304-HTW-LGI, 2021 WL 2386824, at *1 (S.D. Miss. June 10,
2021), appeal docketed, No. 21-60802 (5th Cir. Oct. 18, 2021).
72
Id. at *1, *5.
73
Id. at *4, *9.
74
Id. at *9.
75
Id. at *5, *9. Prior to selection, the arbitrator completed a disclosure form stating he did not have “any
professional or social relationship with any parties” or “connections, direct or indirect, with any of the case
participants . . . .” Id. at *4.
76
Id. at *9.
77
Shaffer, 2021 WL 2386824 at *9. Shaffer stated:
The Fifth Circuit has set out the test for “evident partiality” in the non-disclosure case of Positive
Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 476 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2007 (en banc)). In
Positive Software, the Court held that an arbitrator’s non-disclosure must involve a “reasonable
impression of bias” stemming from “a significant compromising connection to the parties” in order
to warrant vacatur of an arbitration award under § 10(a)(2).
Id. at *9.
78
Id.
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was a guarantor on a loan at the bank through review of its own records, which was “sufficient
to waive” the bank’s claim of “evident partiality” under case authority relied upon by the district
court.79
Shaffer recognized there is a split in the lower courts on the standard of review to be
applied to waive an “evident partiality” objection. 80 Shaffer noted, for example, the Sixth
Circuit has found waiver justified only if the challenging party knew of the precise facts
suggesting bias during the arbitration proceedings.81 Shaffer contrasted that standard with a rule
it first attributed to the Eighth Circuit, and described by later courts,82 as the “constructiveknowledge” standard.83 Under the latter standard, a waiver is found when a party does “‘not
have full knowledge of all the relationships to which they now object, [but] they did have
concerns about [the arbitrator’s] impartiality and yet chose to have her [or him] remain on the
panel rather than spend time and money investigating further until losing the arbitration.’” 84
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Monster Energy applied the “constructive knowledge
standard” for waiver85 differently than Shaffer.86 Monster Energy rejected the argument in its
case that the distributor waived objection to evident partiality by the arbitrator’s disclosure of
his “economic interest” in his official capacity as a JAMS arbitrator, finding it was only akin
to a “partial disclosure” that failed to include the “crucial fact” of the arbitrator’s personal

79

Id. at *8, *12 (citing Light-Age, Inc. v. Ashcroft-Smith, 922 F.3d 320, 322-23 (5th Cir. 2019)).
Shaffer, 2021 WL 2386824 at *10 (“Federal Circuits are split as to whether a complaining party must have
had actual knowledge of the underlying conflict before waiving its right to assert the conflict”).
81
Id. (citing Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1359 (6th Cir. 1989) “(applying waiver only ‘if all
the facts now argued as to the alleged bias were known . . . at the time the arbitrator heard [the]grievances.’)
(internal citations omitted))”; see also Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1204 (11th Cir. 1982)
(“To hold, in the circumstances of this case, that the [challenging parties] waived their right to contest the alleged
impartiality of the neutral arbitrator because the[y] . . . did not discover evidence of partiality prior to arbitration
would put a premium on concealment. Waiver applies only where a party has acted with full knowledge of the
facts”); Univ. Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal Constructors Inc., 304 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2002)
(same); Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 518, 528 (Tex. 2014) (“Tenaska did
not waive its evident partiality challenge by proceeding to arbitration based upon information it was unaware of
at that time”).
82
See, e.g., Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Athena Venture Partners, L.P., 803 F.3d 144, 148 (3d Cir. 2015); LightAge Inc., 922 F.3d at 322-23 (5th Cir. 2019).
83
Shaffer, 2021 WL 2386824 at *11 (citing Kiernan v. Piper Jaffray Cos., Inc., 137 F.3d 588, 593 (8th Cir.
1998)).
84
Id.
85
Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[W]e joined several
of our sister circuits that utilize a constructive knowledge standard when considering whether a party has waived
an evident partiality claim . . . . The Arbitrator undoubtedly knew of his ownership interest in JAMS prior to
arbitration yet failed to disclose it. To find waiver in this circumstance would ‘put a premium on concealment’
in a context where the Supreme Court has long required ‘full disclosure’ (quoting Tenaska Energy and Levine).
Thus, we hold that Olympic Eagle did not have constructive notice of the Arbitrator’s potential non-neutrality,
and therefore did not waive its evident partiality claim”).
86
”Monster Energy, 940 F.3d at 1134; see also Fidelity Federal Bank, FSB v. Durga Ma Corp., 386 F.3d 1306,
1313 (9th Cir. 2004) (“where a party to an arbitration has constructive knowledge of a potential conflict but fails
to timely object”); Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Athena Venture Partners, L.P., 803 F.3d 144, 148 (3d Cir. 2015)
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 888 (8th ed. 2004) (“Constructive knowledge is defined as the ‘[k]nowledge
that one using reasonable care or diligence should have, and therefore that is attributed by law to a given
person’”).
80
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“ownership interest.”87 The district court in Shaffer did not mention that Commonwealth
Coatings had found “highly significant” an arbitration rule that requires a “writing” from both
parties to “waive” circumstances likely to create a presumption of bias or that might disqualify
the arbitrator.88 Shaffer also did not discuss Monster Energy or its precise application of the
“constructive knowledge” standard, nor that the Ninth Circuit did not give any weight to the
fact that the arbitrator’s ownership information had been available to both parties. 89
Manifest Disregard of the Law
In Wilko v. Swan,90 the Supreme Court, in a case involving the Securities Act of
1933, made a passing comment regarding Section 10 of the FAA, observing that
“interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard” are not subject
to “judicial review for error in interpretation.”92 More than a half century later, the Court in
Hall Street93 stated that parties to an arbitration agreement should not “leap” to the conclusion
they can make a “private expansion by contract” based on Wilko.94 Hall Street explained that
petitioner’s request in its case was “too much for Wilko to bear,” stating: “[petitioner] sees this
supposed addition to §10 as the camel’s nose: if judges can add grounds to vacate (or modify),
so can contracting parties.”95
Since Hall Street, a steep chasm has formed in manifest-disregard-of-the-law
doctrine, with multiple courts on one side of the split finding it continues to exist as a “judicial
gloss” under § 10(a)(4) of the FAA, and a few courts concluding it did not survive Hall Street
91

87

Monster Energy, 940 F.3d at 1135. A similar result also was reached in Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa
Pine Energy, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 518, 527 (Tex. 2014) (noting arbitrator’s ownership interest alone may create an
appearance of partiality since it is contrary to the Supreme Court’s “directive to be ‘scrupulous to safeguard the
impartiality of arbitrators’ in a process not subject to appellate review”) (quoting Commonwealth Coatings, 393
U.S. at 149); see also The Jacobs Co., Inc. v. Innovative Ins. Solutions, LLC, No. 173, September Term, 2021
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. Oct. 21, 2021) (rejecting claim of “waiver” of “evident partiality” under state law based on
“financial” relationship, among other things, despite argument that a simple “website” review would have
revealed the arbitrator’s relationship).
88
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
89
Monster Energy, 940 F.3d at 1134-35; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 35, Monster Energy v. City
Beverages LLC, 207 L. Ed. 2d 1100 (June 29, 2020) (No. 19-1333), 2020 WL 2949949, at *35 (noting “the fact
that JAMS is owned by some of its neutrals” is publicly available information).
90
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S.
477, 484 (1989).
91
Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 (1933).
92
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37, supra note 90, overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
93
Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
94
Id. (rejecting a “supposed judicial expansion” of the FAA by virtue of court “interpretation”).
95
Id. at 585.
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because the doctrine is not explicitly enumerated in the FAA. 96 A few years after Hall Street,
the Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp. made clear it had not
decided, and it remains an open question, whether a court may vacate an arbitration award based
on manifest disregard of the law by an arbitrator.97
Factors used to apply the manifest disregard of the law standard also are not uniform.
In Stolt-Nielsen, the Supreme Court accepted, for discussion purposes, a standard used by the
Second Circuit, which requires a showing an arbitrator “knew of the relevant [legal] principle,
appreciated that this principle controlled the outcome of the disputed issue, and nonetheless
willfully flouted the governing law by refusing to apply it.”98 Other circuits have similar rules,
but they also have notable differences.99 Under any application, however, the party seeking to
vacate the award on the basis of a manifest disregard of the law bears a “heavy burden.” 100
Public Policy Exception to Vacating Award Under FAA
There is a recognized split in the lower courts101 whether an arbitration award may be
challenged on public policy grounds following the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street,

96

Luciano v. Tchrs. Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. - Coll. Ret. Equities Fund, No. CV156726MASDEA, 2021
WL 1663712, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2021) (“Since [Hall Street], a circuit split has emerged regarding the manifest
disregard of the law doctrine, with the ‘Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits hav[ing] found that it continues to
exist as a ‘judicial gloss’ under § 10(a)(4),’ while the ‘Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that . . .
[it] no longer survives because it is not enumerated in the FAA’”) (citations omitted); compare Warren v. Geller,
386 F. Supp. 3d 744, 757 (E.D. La. 2019) (“Following Stolt-Nielsen, a Circuit split has developed. The Second,
Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have recognized ‘manifest disregard of law’ as a basis for vacatur. Whereas the
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that ‘manifest disregard of law’ is no longer a legitimate basis for
vacatur”).
97
Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 672 n.3 (2010) (“We do not decide whether
‘manifest disregard’ survives our decision in [Hall Street]”).
98
Id. at 691-92.
99
Interactive Brokers LLC v. Saroop, 969 F.3d 438, 442–43 (4th Cir. 2020) (“‘A court may vacate an arbitration
award under the manifest disregard standard only when a plaintiff has shown that: (1) the disputed legal principle
is clearly defined and is not subject to reasonable debate; and (2) the arbitrator refused to apply that legal
principle’”) (citations omitted); compare Ebbe v. Concorde Inv. Servs., LLC, 953 F.3d 172, 176 (1st Cir. 2020)
(“The manifest disregard standard allows courts to reject an award that ‘is (1) unfounded in reason and fact;
(2) based on reasoning so palpably faulty that no judge, or group of judges, ever could conceivably have made
such a ruling; or (3) mistakenly based on a crucial assumption that is concededly a non-fact’”) (citations omitted);
Whitehead v. Pullman Grp., LLC, 811 F.3d 116, 121 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting movant must show “the arbitrator’s
decision . . . ‘fl[ies] in the face of clearly established legal precedent,’ such as where an arbitrator ‘appreciates
the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it’”).
100
Saroop, 969 F.3d at 443 (“The party seeking to vacate an arbitration award bears a ‘heavy burden’”) (citation
omitted).
101
See Caputo v. Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC, No. 19-17204, 2020 WL 2786934, at *3 (D.N.J. May 29, 2020).
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with an identified majority of courts finding it remains a valid ground for challenge, 102 while a
minority of courts hold the opposite view.103
A court’s refusal to enforce an arbitrator’s award because it is contrary to public policy
is a specific application of the more general doctrine, rooted in the common law, that a court
may refuse to enforce contracts that violate law. 104 If a contract as interpreted by an arbitrator
violates public policy, the Supreme Court has found a court is obliged to refrain from enforcing
it.105 The Court has explained, however, any such public policy must be “explicit,” “well
defined,” and “dominant,” and must be “ascertained by reference to the laws and legal
precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.” 106 This rule of
law has not been yet been fully settled by the Supreme Court in the context of the FAA, 107 but
multiple lower courts have applied the rule to cases governed by the FAA. 108
In Hall Street, the Court considered “whether statutory grounds for prompt vacatur
and modification [of an arbitration award] may be supplemented by contract” negotiated by the
parties.109 As noted, it did not decide whether the FAA permits courts to apply judicially
created, common-law bases for vacatur or modification, such as violation of public policy. At
minimum, there does not appear to be any indication that when Congress enacted the FAA it
intended to displace the common-law rule that had long recognized a public policy exception
102

The Second, Fourth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits as well as the Alaska Supreme Court have all continued to
apply the public-policy exception in post-Hall Street decisions governed by the FAA. See Titan Tire Corp. of
Freeport, Inc. v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l
Union, 734 F.3d 708, 716-17 & n.8 (7th Cir. 2013); Schwartz v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 665 F.3d 444, 451-42
(2d Cir. 2011); Matthews v. Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council, 688 F.3d 1107, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2012);
DeMartini v. Johns, 693 F. App’x 534, 537 (9th Cir. 2017); Wells Fargo Advisers, LLC v. Watts, 540 F. App’x
229, 231 (4th Cir. 2013); Dunham v. Lithia Motors Support Servs., Inc., No. S-15068, 2014 WL 1421780, at *6
(Alaska Apr. 9, 2014).
103
The Eleventh Circuit and the highest courts of Alabama, Florida and Nebraska have held Hall Street
forecloses a public-policy challenge finding “the judicially-created grounds for vacatur . . . are no longer valid.”
Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1314, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Cavalier Mfg., Inc. v.
Gant, 143 So. 3d 762, 768-69 & n.5 (Ala. 2013); Visiting Nurse Ass’n of Fla., Inc. v. Jupiter Med. Ctr., Inc., 154
So. 3d 1115, 1128, 1132 (Fla. 2014); Seldin v. Est. of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185, 207, 939 N.W.2d 768, 787
(2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2622, 209 L. Ed. 2d 751 (2021).
104
United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987).
105
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers,
461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983).
106
Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).
107
In a concurring opinion in Misco, 484 U.S. at 46, Justice Blackmun averred that “issues” relating to whether
“a court’s authority to set aside an arbitration award on public policy grounds differs . . . outside the collectivebargaining context . . . are left for another day.” In Hall Street, Justice Breyer in dissent hinted an award offending
public policy in an FAA case may be treated differently than when no such circumstance exists. Hall St. Assocs.,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 595 (2008) (“I would . . . rule in favor of petitioner’s position . . . . A
decision . . . that does not even arguably offend any public policy whatsoever ‘is adequately justified by a
presumption in favor of freedom’”).
108
Since Hall Street, several federal courts have applied or recognized the public policy exception outside the
labor context in cases governed by the FAA. See Immersion Corp. v. Sony Comp. Ent. Am. LLC, 188 F. Supp.
3d 960, 968 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“Although the public policy defense to enforcement developed primarily in the
context of labor dispute arbitrations, it has been applied to FAA review of arbitration awards”); see also Titan
Tire Corp. of Freeport, Inc. v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv.
Workers Int’l Union, 734 F.3d 708, 716-17 n.8 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Affymax, Inc. v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen
Pharms., Inc., 660 F.3d 281 (7th Cir. 2011) (FAA case holding public-policy exception “survives Hall Street”).
109
Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 578.

14
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2022/iss1/5

14

McLeay: In Words of the Pandemic, Arbitration Jurisprudence Needs a Venti

In Words of the Pandemic, Arbitration Jurisprudence Needs a Ventilator
to enforcement of an arbitration award.110 Since the parties themselves cannot agree to violate
the law, the arbitrator arguably exceeds his or her powers when the award compels a violation
of public policy.111
There also are federalism considerations with a public policy exception to
enforcement of an arbitration award in state court. Under Supreme Court precedent, there is an
assumption that historic police powers of the states are not superseded by federal law and that
courts should be “absolutely certain” Congress intended to displace state authority, for example,
regarding disqualification of a state adjudicator before reaching such a conclusion. 112
Interim Award Applications Seeking Court Review
A.

General Authority on Non-Final Awards

A party seeking to vacate an arbitration award under the FAA must serve notice of a
motion within three months after the award is delivered, and a party seeking to confirm an
award must do so within one year.113 The time requirements are jurisdictional, meaning a
party’s right to vacate an award, for example, is barred if not timely filed. 114
The FAA expressly authorizes an appeal from orders denying or confirming “partial
awards.”115 Justice Ginsburg, joined by two other Justices, observed the Supreme Court has not
given “definitive guidance,” and “lower court opinions are . . . divided,” on when an interim
award or partial award is deemed final and must be appealed to be timely.116 The law is uniform,
however, literally everywhere, that parties cannot themselves decide by agreement or
stipulation when a court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal or any other case. 117

110

United States v. Tex., 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993); cf. Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 483 (4th Cir.
2012) (noting “manifest disregard” of law as a “judicial gloss” on 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)).
111
See, e.g., Brown v. TGS Mgmt. Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 3d 303, 312-13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020) (reversing
confirmation of an award that violated public policy under the California Arbitration Act).
112
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991).
113
9 U.S.C. § 12 (“within three months”); 9 U.S.C. § 9 (“within one year”).
114
See, e.g., Seldin v. Est. of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185, 198, 939 N.W.2d 768, 782 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S.
Ct. 2622, 209 L. Ed. 2d 751 (2021).
115
”An appeal may be taken from . . . an order . . . confirming or denying confirmation of [a] . . . partial award.”
9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(D). Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 670 n.2 (2010) (rejecting
the contention “the question presented” by a partial award was “not ripe”); see also Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v.
Hutson, 229 F. 3d 321, 328 (1st Cir. 2000) (“The . . . Phase 1 Award could be characterized as a partial order . . . .
The statute expressly provides an appeal . . . from orders denying or confirming partial awards”).
116
Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. at 670 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
117
”Parties may not consent to jurisdiction . . . no matter how that consent is phrased.” In re Am. Ready Mix.,
Inc., 14 F.3d 1497, 1502 (10th Cir. 1994). “[E]ven a joint stipulation cannot cure a jurisdictional defect.” Sentry
Select Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 481 F.3d 1208, 1217 (9th Cir. 2007); DeLima v. Tsevi, 301 Neb. 933,
945–946, 921 N.W.2d 89, 98 (2018).
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An arbitrator’s determination whether an interim award is final is only a “factor” to
be considered by a court.118 The argument that a court cannot rule on an interim award where
the “arbitrator characterized it as tentative and subject to revision” has been rejected. 119 Courts
have found multiple interim awards to be “final orders” even when they do not dispose of all
claims submitted in the arbitration.120 The question of timeliness is particularly vexing when an
arbitration extends over many months or even years,121 which adds the risk that the arbitrator
may become unavailable due to death or other reasons before entering a final award. 122
Several federal courts of appeals, and individual federal judges, have recognized or
demonstrated the peril to a party who fails to timely challenge, or seek to confirm, an interim
award in light of jurisdictional time requirements under the FAA. 123 For example, in the Eighth
Circuit, despite an arbitrator announcing he had “explicitly retained jurisdiction” after issuing
an interim award, two federal judges found a party’s failure to challenge an interim award
resulted in the claim becoming time-barred since the party “could have” filed a motion to vacate
the interim award “within 90 days” after its issuance. 124
118

Local 36 Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. Pevely Sheet Metal Co., 951 F.2d 947, 949 (8th Cir.
1992); see also Crawford Grp., Inc. v. Holekamp, No. 406-CV-1274 CAS, 2007 WL 844819, at *4-5 (E.D. Mo.
Mar. 19, 2007) (“Most . . . circuits have held that an interim award which finally disposes of an independent
claim is subject to judicial review . . . The Court rejects defendant’s argument that the interim award should not
be treated as final . . . .”); Publicis Commc’n. v. True N. Commc’ns, Inc., 206 F.3d 725, 728, 730-31 (7th Cir.
2000) (“The content of a decision—not its nomenclature—determines finality . . . [T]he arbitration tribunal’s
[interim] decision—as to this chunk of the case—was final”).
119
Johnson v. Dentsply Sirona Inc., No. 16-cv-0520-CVE-PJC, 2017 WL 4295420, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 27,
2017); see also Vital Pharms. v. PepsiCo, Civil Action No. 20-CIV-62415-RAR, 2020 WL 7625226, at *4 (S.D.
Fla. Dec. 21, 2020) (citing Johnson).
120
Metallgesellschaft A.G. v. M/V Capitan Constante, 790 F.2d 280, 283 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming district
court’s confirmation of “eight orders” and rejecting argument the interim orders should “be regarded as non-final
and non-confirmable,” ruling instead they are “all . . . final orders . . . and therefore may be confirmed although
[they do] not dispose of all the claims that were submitted to arbitration”).
121
Hart Surgical, Inc. v. Ultracision, Inc., 244 F.3d 231, 236 (1st Cir. 2001) (“Another important consideration
is the risk that . . . we may create situations at the arbitration level in which the losing side may forfeit an appeal
(e.g., as to liability) by waiting until all arbitration proceedings are complete”); First State Ins. Co. v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., No. 13-cv-11322-IT, 2014 WL 5342609, at *4 (D. Mass 2014) (citing Hart stating, “[t]hat exact
concern is illustrated here, where First State filed its petition to confirm the award one hundred days after the
February award issued and has argued that Nationwide has forfeited any motion to vacate by not objecting to the
award within ninety days”).
122
Trade & Transp., Inc. v. Nat. Petrol. Charterers, Inc., 931 F.2d 191, 194, 195 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[The] partial
final award . . . could not be disturbed” where it was “rendered before [the arbitrator’s] death[.]”); see also
Zelasko v. Zelasko, No. 342854, 2019 WL 2478015, at *1–2, 4, 6 (Mich. Ct. App. June 13, 2019), appeal denied,
944 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. 2020) (upholding, after arbitrator had passed away, “seven interim awards” which the
arbitrator “indicated that he intended that the final arbitration award would incorporate” under Michigan law,
identical to the FAA).
123
See Hart Surgical, Inc., 244 F.3d at 235 (“Since a party has one year . . . under the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 9, a
contrary decision would have barred [appellant] from confirming the partial award . . . What runs through . . .
decisions is a tension between . . . the parties’ intent to divide an arbitration into distinct phases, and making sure
that a losing party does not thereby forfeit an appeal . . . .”); see also Kerr-McGee Ref. Corp. v. M/T Triumph,
924 F.2d 467, 471 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting it “need not resolve” the issue of “whether the one-year limitation
should apply to a party seeking confirmation of an award that does not end the arbitration[.]”).
124
Int’l Union v. Trane USA, Inc., 970 F.3d 956, 960 (8th Cir. 2020) (Kobes, J., dissenting); see also Schatt v.
Aventura Limousine & Transp. Serv., Inc., 603 Fed. Appx. 881, 885–86, 883 (11th Cir. 2015) (reversing district
court’s order finding interim awards to be “sufficiently ‘final’ for review” even though the arbitrator had indicated
the interim award would be viable “until such time as a final Award” was entered).
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Citing Stolt-Neilsen, one federal court found that a party’s failure to seek judicial
review of an interim award in an “ongoing arbitration” within the three-month limitations
period rendered its later challenge time-barred because the party “had the opportunity to timely
preserve its argument” by filing an objection in court to the interim award.125 A federal district
court echoed the view of the Fifth Circuit that “the Stolt-Nielsen exception may apply, but [the
United States Supreme Court] did not provide the courts with any direction about when or
how.”126 This uncertainty has given rise to a recognized circuit split whether a court has
jurisdiction to confirm a partial award.127

Seldin v. Estate of Silverman—An Arbitration Case Under the Microscope
A.

Background Facts

In Seldin v. Estate of Silverman,128 Scott A. Seldin (“Scott”) and his now late father,
Millard R. Seldin (“Millard”), and their related entities, worked together in commercial real
estate and other business ventures and were known as “Arizona Seldins.” They became
embroiled late in Millard’s life in a complex business dispute subject to arbitration with
Millard’s now deceased brother and brother-in-law and their related entities, which were known
as “Omaha Seldins.”129 The parties entered into a separation agreement that included many
litigation-type rules, including a “claims bar date” to prohibit late claims, required use of the

125

La. Health Serv. Indem. Co. v. Gambro A B, 756 F. Supp. 2d 760, 766 (W.D. La. 2010) (“Gambro had the
opportunity to timely preserve its argument . . . [on] the [interim] Award by filing its objection within the
limitation period under Section 12, just as the petitioner in Stolt-Neilsen . . . Because Gambro chose not to file
such an objection, the Court is powerless to hear it now”); see also Nu-Best Franchising, Inc. v. Motion
Dynamics, Inc., No. 805CV507T27TGW, 2006 WL 1428319 (M.D. Fla. May 17, 2006) (finding motion to vacate
filed more than three months after an interim award was untimely since the interim award resolved the claims in
the arbitration and reserved jurisdiction only for limited relief of attorney fees and costs).
126
Mitchell v. Franchise Servs. of N. Am., Inc., No. 3:18-CV-723-HTW-LRA, 2019 WL 6135058, *7 (S.D.
Miss. Nov. 19, 2019) (“This court is persuaded . . . [by] authority that allows this court to confirm a partial
arbitrator’s award”).
127
La. Health Serv. Indem. Co. v. DVA Renal Healthcare, Inc., 422 F. App’x 313, 314 n.1 (5th Cir. 2011) (“split
exists . . . whether federal courts may hear an interlocutory appeal from an arbitral tribunal”).
128
Seldin, 305 Neb. 185, 939 N.W.2d 768 (2020), cert. denied. 141 S. Ct. 2622, 209 L. Ed. 2d 751 (2021).
129
Seldin, 305 Neb. at 189–90. Millard built a large and thriving commercial real estate business, initially from
his hometown in Omaha, Nebraska, and later with Scott, from Phoenix, Arizona, and he invited his brother, Ted,
and brother-in-law, Stan, to join him in the business from Omaha. Id.
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure during the arbitration, and a requirement for a “reasoned
award”130 for “any decision.”131
The separation agreement is governed by Nebraska law and the arbitration was to take
place in Omaha, Nebraska, subject also to rules of the “Commercial Division” of the American
Bar Association (“AAA rules”).132 Nebraska law is favorable for arbitration. The Nebraska
Supreme Court long ago gave an “instruction” that arbitrators are subject to the “same” ethical
standards as judges.133 A Nebraska statute provides a judge, and thus an arbitrator, is
automatically disqualified if he or she acquires a personal interest in a case without obtaining
express, written consent from the parties and making the writing part of the record in the
proceeding.134 The Nebraska Supreme Court also has recognized as longstanding public policy
that an identifiable double recovery or windfall violates the Nebraska Constitution and will not
be upheld.135
Omaha Seldins’ operative pleading was a 172-paragraph demand for arbitration with
32 separate counts for relief, and Arizona Seldins, including Scott, 136 responded with a

130

”Where parties to an arbitration have agreed and directed the arbitrator to issue a reasoned award, the
arbitrator is obligated to conform to the parties’ directive and issue a reasoned award.” Vold v. Broin & Assocs.,
Inc., 2005 S.D. 80, ¶ 18, 699 N.W.2d 482, 488; Stage Stores, Inc. v. Gunnerson, 477 S.W.3d 848, 860, 864 (Tex.
App. 2015) (reversing confirmation of arbitration award for arbitrator’s failure to issue a “reasoned award” on
key defense). See also Steven Hooten & Richard Bales, “Reasoned” Arbitration Awards, 12 ARB. L. REV. 81,
94–95 (2020) (“[A] reasoned award should address all issues and arguments that were heard during an arbitration
hearing and affect the outcome, and that particular attention should be given to the rejected arguments of the
losing party”).
131
The separation agreement required the arbitrator to make specific written findings of fact and law in “any
decision” rendered, but the parties agreed to revise the requirement to a “reasoned award.” Seldin, 305 Neb. at
211; see also Seldin, Bill of Exceptions (“BOE”), notice filed April 29, 2019 (Image 000076683NSC) (references
to exhibits in the Bill of Exceptions are hereinafter designated as “Ex.”), Ex. 1-A § 9.14.1; see also Ex. 1-D at 9
¶ C (CMO No. 1).
132
Seldin, 305 Neb. at 190, 939 N.W.2d at 776–77.
133
Nebraska judicial “ethical standards” apply to an arbitrator’s neutrality and any failure by the arbitrator to
disclose a conflict of interest. See State v. Pattno, 254 Neb. 733, 739, 579 N.W.2d 503, 507 (1998).
134
NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-739(1)(a) (1879) (noting adjudicator “shall be disqualified from acting . . ., except by
mutual consent of the parties, which mutual consent is in writing and made part of the record . . . [i]n any case in
which . . . he or she is . . . interested”).
135
See, e.g., Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 931, 104 N.W.2d 684, 689 (1960) (“[D]amages which double or
treble the actual compensatory damages established, are in contravention . . . of the Nebraska Constitution”).
136
Scott is included in the definition of “Arizona Seldins” in the separation agreement and in this article. Ex. 1A, supra note 131, at 1. Since Scott had separate claims, he also is sometimes identified individually. Scott’s
briefs
in
the
Nebraska
Supreme
Court
are
publicly
accessible
(https://www.nebraska.gov/courts/sccales/index.cgi) and include a Brief and Cross-Appeal dated August 16,
2019 (Image ID N19229A0JNSC) (“Scott CA Brief”); Motion for Rehearing and Brief dated March 16, 2020
(Image ID N20076C6ANSC, Image ID N20091CCKNSC) (“Scott RH Brief”); and Appellee Scott A Seldin’s
Response to Omaha Seldins’ Motion for Attorney Fees dated March 29, 2020 (Image ID N20090CBNNSC)
(“Scott AF Brief”). Other briefs cited here include Appellants’ Opening Brief dated July 22, 2019 (Image ID
N192039PTNSC) (“AS Brief”); Arizona Seldins’ Response to the Omaha Seldins’ Motion for Attorney Fees
dated March 29, 2020 (Image ID N20090CBONSC) (“Arizona Seldins’ AF Brief”); Brief and Cross-Appeal of
Omaha Seldins’ Appellees dated September 16, 2019 (Image ID N19260AC3NSC) (“OS Brief”); Brief in
Support of Omaha Seldins’ Motion for Attorney Fees dated (N20077C6FNSC) (“Omaha Seldins’ AF Brief”).
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340-paragraph counterclaim with 30 affirmative defenses. 137 In the end, the arbitration took
place over years, with 53 days of hearings, 58 fact and expert witnesses, and 1,985 exhibits.138
During the arbitration, but long after the claims bar date had expired, 139 the arbitrator
allowed what became the largest claim in the arbitration known as “Sky Financial.”140 Under
one theory of the new Sky Financial claim, Omaha Seldins stated Millard engaged in a “rare
misstep”141 in technically committing a securities violation, which resulted in joint and several
liability of the other Arizona Seldins, initially including Scott. 142 But even Omaha Seldins
eventually recognized it was impossible for Scott to have committed “any” form of securities
violations and, as a result, the parties entered a new “mutual agreement” during the arbitration,
contemporaneously approved by the arbitrator, exonerating Scott from “any” securities
violation.143
After reaching the agreement with Scott, Omaha Seldins proceeded in the arbitration
to seek rescission for Millard’s claimed securities violation relating to Sky Financial, arguing
they were entitled to be returned to their status quo as though they were never owners of Sky
Financial.144 At the same time, Omaha Seldins also added a separate theory for damages related
to Sky Financial, alleging they suffered lost “corporate opportunities” as Sky Financial owners
as a result of Millard’s actions.145
At a hearing held approximately seven months before the final award, and without
prior notice, Omaha Seldins presented legal assignments to the “arbitrator” that would
“irrevocably” transfer their Sky Financial ownership interests to the arbitrator in his official
role “as arbitrator.”146 Omaha Seldins stated they sought to take this action to satisfy a “tender”
requirement (return of the securities) prescribed by applicable law when rescission is sought.147
The arbitrator initially questioned this proffer, 148 but ultimately confirmed to Arizona Seldins
his belief he was authorized to accept it in his formal role “as arbitrator,” stating, in that
capacity, he had “jurisdiction” and would treat the matter as an official “act of interpleading”

137

Ex. 10-07; Ex. 2-F.
Seldin, 305 Neb. at 191, 939 N.W.2d at 778-79.
139
Scott CA Brief, supra note 136, at 9.
140
Seldin, 305 Neb. at 191-92, 939 N.W. 2d at 778 (“Sky Financial Securities, LLC . . . is an Arizona limited
liability company, created as part of a plan to acquire and operate a chain of pizza restaurants in numerous states”).
141
Scott CA Brief, supra note 136, at 10.
142
Id. at 22.
143
Id. at 11.
144
Seldin, 305 Neb. at 192, 939 N.W.2d at 778 (noting the arbitrator awarded $3,135,681 “in recessionary [sic]
damages for the securities violation claims”).
145
Id. (noting “the arbitrator awarded the Omaha Seldins $1,962,528 in damages for their lost corporate
opportunities claims” in addition to the rescission theory).
146
Seldin, 305 Neb. at 201, 939 N.W.2d at 784. Under Arizona law, purchasers of securities may obtain
rescission to recover consideration paid for securities, but must “tender” the securities to obtain such relief. A.R.S.
§ 44-2001(A).
147
Id.
148
Id. (“ARBITRATOR: why would the assignment come to me?”).
138
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Sky Financial to the arbitration tribunal.149 Because the proposed action did not involve
compromising the arbitrator with personal ownership, and further because an interpleader150 to
the arbitration tribunal would ensure there should never be a double recovery awarded against
them, Arizona Seldins agreed151 to this narrow, unusual request.152
Unfortunately for Scott and Arizona Seldins, the final award brought surprise. 153 The
arbitrator revealed for the first time in the final award he privately determined during the
arbitration that he had acquired Sky Financial in his personal capacity and further found it to
be important to “individually” “disclaim[]” and “release” all such personal interests in Sky
Financial in the final award.154
The arbitrator awarded financial damages to Omaha Seldins in the final award on the
basis of their ownership in Sky Financial.155 At the same time, the arbitrator also added millions
of dollars to Omaha Seldins’ recovery by granting their request for rescission relating to Sky
Financial as though they had never been owners.156 These rulings also appeared antithetical to
a formula157 in the final award designed to avoid a double recovery.158
In addition to awarding damages and rescission, the arbitrator announced in the final
award he was transferring “back” to Omaha Seldins the Sky Financial interests he had privately
149

Id. (“ARBITRATOR: Well, the only way I know how to deal with this right now is to consider this an act of
interpleading these interests to me. I’m not an officer of the court, but I do have jurisdiction over the matter, so
for the time being, at least, I’ll accept them”). A few weeks later the arbitrator entered an interim award, which
was later incorporated into the final award, showing his earlier acceptance of a formal tender of Sky Financial in
his official capacity as arbitrator was not temporary and had become final. Ex. 1 at 341; Ex. 10 at 71-72 (“Certain
membership interests in Sky Financial were formally tendered to the arbitrator at the . . . hearing”). See also Scott
CA Brief, supra note 136, at 8.
150
Under Nebraska law, a party invoking an interpleader “must not have nor claim any interest” in the subject
property. Strasser v. Com. Nat’l Bank, 157 Neb. 570, 573, 60 N.W.2d 672, 674 (1953) (“It is the essence of an
interpleader . . . that the party invoking the remedy . . ., assert[] no interest in himself”). Other jurisdictions apply
the same rule. Pac. Loan Mgmt. Corp. v. Super. Ct., 196 Cal. App. 3d 1485, 1489, 242 Cal. Rptr. 547 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987).
151
E1, 452-72:15-17, I. Arizona Seldins preserved an objection “for the record,” stating they were not “going to
commit” to “how” language in the written assignments, for example, the specific “relief . . . to be awarded,”
would be “recognized” by the arbitrator. Seldin Supplemental Transcript dated April 2, 2019 in Case No. A19310 (Image ID A00102653NSC) (“Seldin ST”) at 12, 128; E53-A at 7.
152
Seldin, 305 Neb. at 202, 939 N.W.2d at 784. The arbitrator also represented he would seek “guidance” from
the parties on how to “deal” with the interpleader “at the point in time where an award is entered.” Scott CA
Brief, supra note 136, at 25.
153
Ex. 1-QQ at 462-63 (final award).
154
AS Brief, supra note 136, at 13 (quoting final award: “The Arbitrator, individually and d/b/a . . . a Colorado
corporation, disclaims and releases any and all right, title and interest in any and all membership interests that
were or could have been the subject of the Original Assignments. And to the extent deemed necessary, the
Arbitrator hereby re-assigns any and all such interests back to the assignors [i.e. two Omaha Seldins entities].”
See also Scott CA Brief, supra note 136, at 28.
155
Omaha Seldins asserted in support of their lost corporate opportunity claim that their ownership of Sky
Financial made the “great deal possible” because their “assets” were used “to obtain the opportunity” to earn
significant “distributions and fees.” Scott CA Brief, supra note 136, at 15.
156
Seldin, 305 Neb. At 192, 939 N.W.2d at 778; Scott CA Brief, supra note 136, at 15.
157
Scott CA Brief, supra note 136, at 12–13, 15.
158
The formula on the face of the final award provides any recovery for Sky Financial securities violations is to
be reduced by “income received . . . from ownership of the securities.” Id. at 12 (quoting final award). The final
award specifies both the precise amount of damages for securities violations ($3,185,681) as well as the precise
“income . . . from ownership” ($1,962,528) to facilitate a mathematical reduction dictated by the formula. Id.
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determined he acquired “individually,” arguably creating a triple recovery159 to Omaha
Seldins.160 Despite the new mutual agreement with Scott, which had superseded161 an earlier
general oral agreement,162 the final award also found Scott jointly and severally liable for
securities violations related to Sky Financial.163 The triple recovery164 and inconsistent action
toward Scott were later shown when Omaha Seldins brought new Sky Financial claims against
Arizona Seldins, including Scott, in an Arizona court where Omaha Seldins claimed to be
owners of Sky Financial again, despite their earlier irrevocable transfer by written
assignments.165
The arbitrator did not disclose to Arizona Seldins before the final award that he had
determined the transfer of Sky Financial involved him individually acquiring personal
ownership interests in Sky Financial.166 The arbitrator also did not obtain written consent from
the parties, or make such a writing part of the arbitration record, as mandated by Nebraska
law,167 in order for the arbitrator to avoid becoming immediately disqualified. 168 The arbitrator
entered a final net award169 for Omaha Seldins in the amount of $2,997,031, plus interest. 170
The final award incorporated twelve interim awards, each of which states it is “law of
the case,” but also includes a statement that “[t]he parties understand” the interim award “is not
a final appealable arbitration award.”171 Prior to the final award, and primarily due to

159

Id. at 15, 25.
Id. at 14; AS Brief, supra note 136, at 13 (quoting final award).
161
Hagerbaumer v. Hagerbaumer Bros., Inc., 208 Neb. 613, 617, 305 N.W.2d 4, 7 (1981) (“A contract complete
in itself will be conclusively presumed to supersede and discharge another . . . concerning the same subject
matter, where . . . the later . . . [is] inconsistent . . . .”) (citations omitted).
162
Scott CA Brief, supra note 136, at 22; Scott RH Brief, supra note 136, at 6.
163
Seldin v. Est. of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185, 215, 939 N.W.2d 768, 791 (2020), cert. denied. 141 S. Ct. 2622,
209 L. Ed. 2d 751 (2021).
164
When the Sky Financial assignments were first presented in the arbitration, Omaha Seldins were asked
questions addressed to whether the transfer of Sky Financial as part of an interpleader could result in Sky
Financial ever coming back to them to which Omaha Seldins responded in the arbitrator’s presence: “It’s an
unconditional and irrevocable assignment. That’s what it says.” Scott CA Brief, supra note 136, at 14. Omaha
Seldins later declared in the Arizona court after the final award that they were again owners of Sky Financial and
entitled to relief, stating: “The Omaha Seldins hold equity ownership interests in debtor Sky Financial
Investments, LLC.” Id. at 15–16 (quoting record).
165
A triple recovery in this context can be explained by analogy. Assume a purchaser bought a home under
contract at fair market value for $250,000 and, after discovering a faulty foundation, paid $50,000 for it to be
fixed, and then filed suit against the seller. At minimum, the purchaser could choose to return to the status quo
by moving out of the house and seek rescission of the purchase price of $250,000. Or the purchaser could affirm
the contract, continue to reside in the house as owner and recover out-of-pocket costs of $50,000. A purchaser
would receive a windfall, however, if the purchaser was allowed to recover $250,000 in relief for rescission and
$50,000 in damages and also allowed to continue living in the house.
166
Ex. 1-QQ, supra note 131, at 462–63 (final award).
167
NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-739 (Reissue 2016); State v. Pattno, 254 Neb. 739, 579 N.W.2d 507 (1998).
168
State v. Vidales, 6 Neb. Ct. App. 163, 176, 571 N.W.2d 117, 124 (1997) (vacating prior order as “void and
of no effect” even though it was entered before the judge had any personal knowledge of his disqualifying
interest).
169
Ex. 1-QQ, supra note 131, at 462–63 (final award).
170
Seldin v. Est. of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185, 192, 208, 939 N.W.2d 768, 788(2020), cert. denied 141 S. Ct.
2622, 209 L. Ed. 2d 751 (2021).
171
Seldin, 305 Neb. At 192, 212, 939 N.W.2d at 778, 790.
160
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differences related to Sky Financial,172 Scott173 decided to act cautiously by filing interim award
applications in five specific instances.174
Citing case authority,175 Scott explained he filed the interim award applications only
in an “abundance of caution” and in a manner to avoid the parties or the district court from
having to take piecemeal action until the final award in the arbitration was entered.176 The
parties soon thereafter stipulated to a stay, and the district court approved the stipulation, fully
eliminating, as represented, the need for any action by the parties or the district court before the
final award.177
B.

Seldin Court Review

After the final award was entered, Arizona Seldins filed an application to modify or
vacate the final award in the district court, while Omaha Seldins filed a motion to confirm the
final award.178 Despite the great length and extent of the commercial litigation-styled
arbitration, Arizona Seldins and Scott,179 according to the district court, identified only five
issues under the FAA to be heard and all of them were based on a single subject, Sky
Financial.180 The district court conducted an initial hearing for a few hours and received briefs
on post-arbitration motions and later asked the parties to appear for a second hearing. 181

172

As of the time Sky Financial was under review in the arbitration, Scott and Arizona Seldins had prevailed
under the law-of-case interim awards on a net basis in the amount of $2,101,178. Scott CA Brief, supra note 136,
at 8–9.
173
Scott retained appellate counsel during the arbitration in part because it became clear he had separate issues
relating to Sky Financial and he also sought to preserve his position in regard to a few interim awards. See id. at
2. The FAA affords relief to “any” person, such as Scott individually, seeking to challenge an award. 9 U.S.C.
§ 10(a)(3); see also Scott CA Brief, supra note 136, at 25.
174
Seldin, 305 Neb. At 212, 939 N.W.2d at 790; see also Scott CA Brief, supra note 136, at 16. Scott’s request
further was not inconsistent with the separation agreement, which allowed him to request “equitable procedures
in a court to obtain interim relief . . . to preserve the status quo . . . pending resolution by” the arbitrator and to
enforce “any” award. Ex. 1-A, supra note 131, at § 9.14.3.
175
Seldin, 305 Neb. At 212, 939 N.W.2d at 790. See, e.g., Seldin 2nd Supplemental Transcript in Case No. A-19310 dated May 21, 2019 (Image ID A00105706NSC) (“Seldin 2d ST”) at 106 n.2 (citing In re: Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc., 419 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. App. 2010) (“Chevron”).
176
Seldin, 305 Neb. At 212, 939 N.W.2d at 790. For example, Scott included in the caption of the first interim
award application, “REQUEST STAY OF ACTION,” in all capitalized and bold letters, and explained in the
body of the application that piecemeal action was not sought and would not be necessary. See, e.g., Seldin 2d ST,
supra note 175, at 1 (emphasis omitted).
177
See Seldin 2d ST, supra note 175, at 56.
178
Seldin ST, supra note 151, at 1-9.
179
Seldin ST, supra note 151, at 119-20 ((1) arbitrator ownership – misbehavior; (2) claim bar date – no reasoned
award; (3) legal fees and expenses not allowed; (4) materially miscalculated prejudgment interest; and (5)
material mistake resulting in Scott’s joint and several liability for Sky Financial). Arizona Seldins also asked the
district court to consider that the arbitrator’s award of a double recovery violated public policy, but it was not
addressed. Id. at 143.
180
Id.
181
At the end of the initial hearing, the district court stated the parties had done an “excellent job” in providing
“very helpful” assistance in light of the complexity of the case and noted it may seek “additional argument” in a
second hearing, which later occurred. AS Brief, supra note 136, at 35-36. Seldin ST, supra note 151, at 115.
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The district court entered an order finding the issues “did not involve resolution of
complicated factual disputes,”182 overruled Arizona Seldins’ objections, confirmed the final
award183 and awarded attorney fees in favor of Omaha Seldins as a sanction. 184 On appeal, the
Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, modifying it to include
additional attorney fees185 and a further award of sanctions.186
C.

Unique Legal Issues in Seldin
1.

Claims Bar Date

The district court rejected Arizona Seldins’ objection187 to an order of the arbitrator
allowing the largest claim in the arbitration, Sky Financial, to be late added long past the claims
bar date deadline.188 The district court acknowledged the arbitrator failed to even consider the
“concept” of a procedure (“relation back”) required to be used, but it claimed Arizona Seldins
had “mischaracterize[d]” its significance.189 The district court did not discuss that the arbitrator
had entered specific orders190 during the arbitration observing that the relation back method was

182

Seldin ST, supra note 151, at 62.
Seldin v. Est. of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185, 192, 195, 939 N.W.2d 768, 780 (2020), cert. denied 141 S. Ct.
2622, 209 L. Ed. 2d 751 (2021); see also Seldin ST, supra note 151, at 139–40.
184
Seldin, 305 Neb. At 217, 939 N.W.2d at 793 (awarding $131,184.45).
185
Id., 305 Neb. at 212, 219, 939 N.W.2d at 790, 795 (“[W]e . . . affirm the district court’s award of sanctions . . .
and order the fee judgment in favor of the Omaha Seldins be increased to $342,860.95”).
186
See Neb. App. Cts. Case Search, NEB. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.nebraska.gov/justice (last accessed
December 19, 2021) (adding $50,000.00 in docket order dated August 26, 2020).
187
Garlock v. 3DS Props., L.L.C., 303 Neb. 521, 534, 930 N.W.2d 503, 513 (Neb. 2019) (preserving “judicial
challenge to arbitrability”).
188
Seldin ST, supra note 151, at 133-34. The district court first suggested Arizona Seldins “waived” their
objection to the arbitrator’s failure to provide a “reasoned award,” but its “waiver” analysis is not in accord with
other parts of its opinion in which it found claims are not ripe until the final award. Compare Seldin ST at 68
(finding Scott’s objections were not ripe until the final award based on “explicit agreement” of the parties and
arbitrator consent) with Seldin ST at 11 (suggesting waiver of objection even though a reasoned award is not due
until the final award based on the same explicit agreement). There also is substantial authority an arbitrator cannot
rule on an objection by a party after the final award. Ex. 60-B at 2 n.3 (discussing “functus officio”).
189
Seldin ST, supra note 151, at 133-34. The district court did not discuss a leading case on relation-back doctrine
presented by Arizona Seldins, which demonstrates why a reasoned award was required in this circumstance. Ex
53-A at 20-22 (citing Glover v. F.D.I.C., 698 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing relation back under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15).
190
See Ex. 53-A at 5 (Scott’s trial court brief dated August 11, 2017) (arbitrator declaring as “law of the case”
the requirement that, after the claims bar date, any proposed new claim “will be barred . . . subject, however, to
the parties’ right, . . . to amend and/or supplement their Ancillary Claims . . . and relate them back in accordance
with Rule 15, F.R.C.P.”); Ex. 4-J at 399-400. See also Scott CA Brief, supra note 136, at 33 (quoting arbitrator’s
order that any amended claim is “required to follow the procedure” of “relat[ion] . . . back in accordance with
Rule 15, F.R.C.P”).
183
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mandatory.191 On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court did not address case authority
demonstrating an arbitrator must comply with any agreed upon “method,” 192 or specifically
consider the prejudice involved to Arizona Seldins by the arbitrator’s action, but ruled instead
the arbitrator was merely interpreting the separation agreement. 193
2.

Joint and Several Liability

The district court rejected194 as “misleading” 195 the argument196 that the arbitrator
made a material mistake197 in finding Scott jointly and severally liable for securities
violations198 because the district court found such liability is “firmly rooted in the terms of the
Separation Agreement.”199 But joint and several liability is not included in the separation
agreement for any claim.200 An arbitrator also is not automatically entitled to deference for his
or her interpretation of an oral agreement merely because it concerns a subject related to the

191

The district court also appeared to rely on the arbitrator’s speculation of what he “heard” about a Rule 26
report submitted to the former arbitrator. See Seldin ST, supra note 151, at 132; see also OS Brief, supra note
136, at 13, 58. The arbitrator did not prepare a reasoned award—even though he was adding the biggest claim
awarded in the arbitration after the claims bar date—showing he conducted any relation back analysis on any
Rule 26 report he “heard” about. Id.; Ex. 2-H at 210; see also Ex. 53-A, supra note 190, at 11 (Scott’s trial court
brief dated August 11, 2017) (quoting Stage Stores, Inc. v. Gunnerson, 477 S.W.2d 848, 860, 864 (Tex. Ct. App.
2015) (vacating award for failure to issue a “reasoned award” on key defense).
192
See Seldin, 305 Neb. at 217, 939 N.W.2d at 793 (citing Scott CA Brief, supra note 136, at 33, but not
discussing Crawford Grp., Inc. v. Holekamp, 543 F.3d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 2008)); see also Scott AF Brief, supra
note 136 (noting “arbitrator was ‘obliged’ under the ‘AAA Code’ to ‘comply’ with ‘the relation-back procedure[]’
in a reasoned award”). See also Vold v. Broin & Assoc., Inc., 2005 S.D. 80, ¶ 18, 699 N.W.2d 482, 487-88
(“Where parties to an arbitration have agreed and directed the arbitrator to issue a reasoned award, the arbitrator
is obligated to conform to the parties’ directive and issue a reasoned award”).
193
Allowing the Sky Financial claim to be made after the claims bar date significantly impacted Scott in relation
to an earlier oral agreement on joint and several liability. Scott RH Brief, supra note 136, at 5-6; Scott CA Brief,
supra note 136, at 19.
194
Ex. 53-A, supra note 190, at 9-10; Seldin ST, supra note 151, at 139. Seldin, 305 Neb. At 215, 939 N.W.2d
at 791.
195
Seldin ST, supra note 151, at 138.
196
Scott showed the new “mutual agreement” between the parties incorporated into the final award, and approved
by the arbitrator, fully exonerated Scott from “any” form of liability, including joint and several liability, for
securities violations related to Sky Financial. See Scott CA Brief, supra note 136, at 10-11, 16-18 (citing the
record and discussing arguments made to the district court).
197
9 U.S.C. §11(a) authorizes a court to correct an arbitration award on this ground.
198
Scott CA Brief, supra note 136, at 10-11, 13 and 18.
199
Seldin ST, supra note 151, at 138.
200
See generally Ex. 1-A, supra note 131. The district court cited passing comments made by, or in the presence
of, the arbitrator regarding expected enforcement of the final award from a “collection” standpoint, but
enforcement is not discussed in the separation agreement or AAA rules and is not a matter over which the
arbitrator has any power. Seldin ST, supra note 151, at 139; see generally Pac. Reinsurance Mgmt Corp. v. Ohio
Reinsurance Corp., 935 F.2d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1991 (“Arbitrators have no power to enforce their decisions”).
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arbitration.201 On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court essentially found the same202 and chose
not to address203 caselaw and other arguments204 bearing upon joint and several liability.205
D.

Issues in Seldin in Conflict in Courts

On specific issues for which there is widespread conflict in state and federal courts,
the district court and Nebraska Supreme Court analyses and rulings in Seldin were as follows:
Arbitrator Ownership. The district court recognized arbitrator ownership as a “major
focus” of Arizona Seldins, but reframed206 the argument as invoking “evident partiality,”

201

An arbitrator is not automatically entitled to deference by a court in regard to his or her interpretation of a
“modification” to the operative arbitration agreement. See, e.g., Scott AF Brief, supra note 136, at 6 (quoting Int’l
Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. V. TRW Auto. U.S. LLC, 766 F. App’x
186, 188 (6th Cir. 2019) (“TRW challenged an aspect of the remedy awarded by the arbitrator that provided relief
on the basis of an implicit agreement beyond the scope of the [operative] agreement and its arbitration clause.
Notwithstanding the extraordinary deference accorded to arbitral decisions, it was error for the district court to
enforce that aspect of the arbitral award in this case”)); see also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters
Local No. 744, 280 F.3d 1138 (7th Cir. 2002) (“We have pointed out that an arbitrator cannot shield himself from
judicial correction by merely ‘making noises of contract interpretation’”) (citation omitted; emphasis in original).
202
Seldin v. Est. of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185, 215–16, 939 N.W.2d 768, 791–92 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct.
2622, 209 L. Ed. 2d 751 (2021). Like the district court, the Nebraska Supreme Court also mistakenly stated joint
and several liability was found in the “terms of the separation agreement.” Id. at 792; see generally Ex. 1-A,
supra note 131.
203
The Nebraska Supreme Court chose not to address Scott’s contention that the term “Respondents” in the net
award rendered the final award unenforceable due to ambiguity. Seldin, 305 Neb. at 185-221, 939 N.W.2d at
768-95; see Scott CA Brief, supra note 136, at 21-22; Scott RH Brief, supra note 136, at 3-5. But the court itself
must independently “determine whether the arbitration award is ambiguous.” Id. (quoting Brown v. Witco Corp.,
340 F.3d 209, 220 n.12 (5th Cir. 2003). Compare Defterios v. Dallas Bayou Bend, Ltd., 350 S.W.3d 659, 674
(Tex. Ct App. 2011) (“We . . . reform the judgment by deleting all references to a joint and several recovery”).
204
Scott acknowledged, absent a double recovery, he could be jointly and severally liable for damages on the
non-securities claim ($1,962,528). Ex. 53-A, supra note 190, at 9-10; Scott CA Brief, supra note 136, at 11, 13;
Scott RH Brief, supra note 136, at 5-6. But Scott explained he should not be jointly and severally liable for the
securities violations ($3,185,681) after the parties agreed, and the arbitrator approved during the arbitration, a
new, superseding agreement. Id. The district court had suggested Scott was liable for securities violations because
he was jointly and severally liable for lost “corporate opportunities,” but it did not explain how one could cause
the other. Id.; see also Seldin ST, supra note 151, at 139.
205
The Nebraska Supreme Court did not address “indistinguishable” legal authority existing at the time of the
district court decision in support of vacating statutory legal expenses awarded as damages. Ex. 60-A at 3; Ex. 60B at 1-2 (citing Sabre GLBL, Inc. v. Shan, No. 15-cv-8900, 2018 WL 1905802 (D.N.J. Apr. 23, 2018), rev’d, 779
F. App’x 843 (3d Cir. 2019). See also Arizona Seldins’ AF Brief, supra note 136, at 4-5. The Nebraska Supreme
Court raised AAA rules as relevant, but did not discuss that the separation agreement includes an “[u]nless . . .
inconsistent” clause, which other courts have indicated subordinates AAA rules to conflicting contract provisions.
Compare Brady v. Williams Capital Grp., L.P., 878 N.Y.S.2d 693, 695, 698 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009), aff’d as
modified, 14 N.Y.3d 459, 928 N.E.2d 383 (N.Y. 2010) (observing “arbitration agreement” with “except as
provided” provision takes “precedence over the AAA rules”); Beacon Towers Condo Trust v. Alex, 473 Mass.
472, 476-77, 42 N.E.3d 1144, 1148 (2016) (incorporation of AAA rules themselves are “not a sufficient
contractual basis for an award of fees”).
206
Arizona Seldins led with the argument that arbitrator ownership in this context constituted “misbehavior”
under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). Seldin, 305 Neb. At 210, 939 N.W.2d at 789; see also Seldin ST, supra note 151, at 6,
119.
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declared Commonwealth Coatings to be “inapposite” and chose not to discuss Arizona Seldins’
contention the issue should be resolved by a Nebraska statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-739(1)(a).207
On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court did consider Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-739(1)(a)
and reaffirmed its prior “instruction” of Nebraska law that arbitrators are subject to the “same”
ethical rules as judges.208 But, like the district court, the Nebraska Supreme Court refashioned
Arizona Seldins’ argument to be primarily based on “evident partiality” and found the Nebraska
statute to be inapplicable.209 The Nebraska Supreme Court found “judicial ethics” are not to be
applied to arbitrators under the FAA based on its precedent, which adopted Justice White’s
concurring opinion in Commonwealth Coatings.210 The Nebraska Supreme Court did not
discuss the conflicting decision in Monster Energy211 raised by Scott212 or acknowledge the
substantial split in the lower courts, or that the binding majority opinion in Commonwealth
Coatings approved use of a “canon of judicial ethics” for determining “evident partiality” under
the FAA.213 The Nebraska Supreme Court referred to AAA rules,214 but it did not apply

207
The district court remarked the arbitrator’s personal ownership of Sky Financial was “unusual” and not “the
best solution,” but it did not address the question under NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-739(1)(a), even though the issue
was raised in oral argument and in written submissions. Seldin ST, supra note 151, at 128, 130, 117-140; BOE,
supra note 131, at 140:7-141:3; 149:24-150:8; Ex. 53-F at 1-3. See also Scott AF Brief, supra note 136, at 3
(noting “the district court declined to address the question” raised by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-739(1)(a)).
208
Seldin, 305 Neb. At 204 n.30, 939 N.W.2d at 785 (quoting Dowd v. First Omaha Secs. Corp., 242 Neb. 347,
495 N.W.2d 36, 42 (1993) (adopting “have to conclude” standard in Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist.
Council Carpenters Benefit Fund, 748 F.2d 79, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1984) and referring to majority opinion in
Commonwealth Coatings as “plurality opinion”); but see Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994)
(“Commonwealth Coatings is not a plurality opinion . . . .”).
209
Seldin, 305 Neb. At 203–04, 939 N.W.2d at 785. The Nebraska Supreme Court did not suggest the arbitrator
complied with NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-739(1)(a), or reject Arizona Seldins’ contention that application of the
statute requires disqualification of the arbitrator. Seldin, 305 Neb. At 203–04, 939 N.W.2d at 785. Seldin ST,
supra note 151, at 13; BOE, supra note 131, at 140:7-141:3; 149:24-150:8; Seldin ST, supra note 151, at 11740; Ex. 53-F, supra note 131, at 1-3.
210
Seldin, 305 Neb. at 204, 939 N.W.2d at 785 (quoting Dowd, 242 Neb. at 347, 495 N.W.2d at 43 (adopting
“have to conclude” standard in Morelite Constr. Corp., 748 F.2d at 83-84 (based on Justice White’s concurring
opinion in Commonwealth Coatings).
211
Compare Seldin, 305 Neb. at 204, 939 N.W.2d at 785 (applying “have to conclude” standard), with Monster
Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130, 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 2019), cert denied, 207 L. Ed. 2d 1100
(2020) (applying “reasonable impression of bias” standard); see also Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. TUCO Inc., 960
S.W.2d 629, 633-34 (Tex. 1997) (noting “reasonable impression of partiality” standard “is much broader than
the “have to conclude” standard).
212
Monster Energy was announced after briefing deadlines had passed, but Scott raised it during oral argument
and in post-argument briefing. See Supreme Court Oral Argument Archive, NEB. JUD. BRANCH,
https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/courts/supreme-court/oral-argument-archive (last accessed December 19,
2021); see also Scott AF Brief, supra note 131, at 4; see also id. at 10 (noting “split concerning the interpretation
of ‘evident partiality’” under Commonwealth Coatings).
213
Seldin, 305 Neb. at 203–04, 939 N.W.2d at 785.
214
Seldin, 305 Neb. At 204, 939 N.W.2d at 785. The Nebraska Supreme Court correctly noted AAA rules
authorize an arbitrator to enter “interim measures” for “protection . . . of property,” but it did not discuss that
AAA ethical rules are controlled by “applicable law” and that AAA rules do not “take the place of or supersede
such laws.” Ex. 11 at 2 (AAA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes). See Scott CA Brief at 8;
Scott AF Brief, supra note 136, at 3.
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Nebraska “applicable law” as directed by those rules215 or credit Arizona Seldins with making
a reasonable argument, even though decisional law on the other side of the court split would
have changed the result.216
Waiver. The district court found Arizona Seldins “waived” any objection to the
arbitrator’s personal ownership of Sky Financial because of their response to the arbitrator’s
representation that he would conduct a legal “interpleader” in the arbitration tribunal in his
official capacity “as arbitrator.”217 On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court found the same,218
adding that the record refutes the claim that the interpleader “was not disclosed or explained.” 219
The Nebraska Supreme Court did not discuss that the agreed interpleader, which was to be
completed by the arbitrator acting in his official capacity, never took place and was cancelled,
sub silentio, after the arbitrator privately determined he had accepted title to Sky Financial in
his personal capacity.220 The Nebraska Supreme Court’s opinion shows it has adopted a
“constructive knowledge” standard for determining waiver of “evident partiality,” even though,
like the Eighth Circuit, it did not expressly identify the standard by name. 221 The Nebraska
Supreme Court also did not mention the court split on the issue222 or different application of the
constructive knowledge standard when personal ownership is found to be the “crucial fact” as
the Monster Energy decision223 raised by Scott shows.224

215

Nebraska law supplies the default “procedural” rules for arbitrations taking place “in Nebraska.” Cullinane v.
Beverly Enters.-Neb., Inc., 300 Neb. 210, 226, 912 N.W.2d 774, 790-91 (2018) (“Arbitration in Nebraska is
governed by the UAA . . ., but if arbitration arises from . . . interstate commerce, it is governed by the FAA . . .
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has never held . . . a procedural section, applies to state courts”).
216
See infra pp. 31-32.
217
Seldin ST, supra note 151, at 128.
218
Seldin, 305 Neb. At 204, 939 N.W.2d at 785.
219
Id. The Nebraska Supreme Court found Arizona Seldins’ consent contemplated the Sky Financial “asset”
would be delivered to the “appropriate party,” but the assignments expressly state they were “irrevocably and
unconditionally” transferred by Omaha Seldins as an “act of interpleading” and not to be returned. Seldin, 305
Neb. at 192, 201–02, 939 N.W.2d at 778, 784. See Scott CA Brief, supra 136, at 13-14. If the “interpleader” was
meant to be something other than the well-known procedure under Nebraska law, such meaning was not disclosed
or explained. See id. at 24. Arizona Seldins argued they should not be found to have consented to what amounts
to secret rules of interpleader in this scenario. Id.
220
The Nebraska Supreme Court’s analysis on this point should be reconsidered. By analogy, it would be like a
doctor scheduling a much needed operation for a patient in 30 days, only to abruptly cancel the surgery on the
scheduled date because the doctor privately determined he or she is not licensed to perform the operation, and
then delivering a disclaimer stating he or she never was. The patient’s consent is not the relevant issue of concern.
Arizona Seldins’ consent to the arbitrator performing a formal interpleader in his official capacity likewise was
not the relevant issue identified by Arizona Seldins in Seldin.
221
Kiernan v. Piper Jaffray Cos., 137 F.3d 588, 593 (8th Cir. 1998); see Shaffer v. PriorityOne Bank, No. 3:15CV-304-HTW-LGI, 2021 WL 2386824, at *11 (S.D. Miss. June 10, 2021) (citing Kiernan, 137 F.3d at 493).
222
Shaffer, 2021 WL 2386824 at *10 (“Federal Circuits are split . . . .”).
223
Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 207 L. Ed.
2d 1100 (2020).
224
Monster Energy was announced after briefing deadlines had passed, but Scott raised Monster Energy during
oral argument and post-argument briefing. See Supreme Court Oral Argument Archive, NEB. JUD. BRANCH,
https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/courts/supreme-court/oral-argument-archive (last accessed December 19,
2021); see also Scott AF Brief, supra note 131, at 4; see also id. at 10 (noting “split concerning the interpretation
of ‘evident partiality’” under Commonwealth Coatings).
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Public Policy. The district court claimed Arizona Seldins225 had failed to argue that
double recovery in the final award had violated Nebraska “public policy,”226 but it was mistaken
in this view since Arizona Seldins had expressly argued in the district court that the arbitrator
“violated Nebraska public policy and entered [an] award that was a windfall . . . and should be
vacated.”227 On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court combined two separate strains of FAA
decisional law in analyzing the question of whether a public policy exception exists under the
FAA and did not mention there are conflicts in the lower courts on both grounds.228 Specifically,
the Nebraska Supreme Court quoted an Eighth Circuit case, 229 which cited the Supreme Court
decision in Hall Street,230 to conclude that “manifest disregard of the law” is no longer viable
after Hall Street and that, as a result, an exception based on public policy recognized by some
courts also must suffer the same fate.231
The Nebraska Supreme Court did not discuss232 that lower courts are divided on the
continuing vitality of “manifest disregard of the law.”233 Nor did it discuss that the Supreme
Court, even before the cited Eighth Circuit case, had decided “manifest disregard of the law”

225

See Seldin 2nd Supplemental Transcript in Case No. A-19-311 dated April 2, 2019 (Image ID
A00102651NSC) (“Seldin 19-311 2d ST”) at 64. Scott and other Arizona Seldins filed a joint application to
modify or vacate the final award, reserving “all the arguments” made by the other. BOE, supra note 131, at 8:1822, 76:19-77:1, 107:1-2; Seldin ST, supra note 151, at T1-8.
226
Seldin ST, supra note 151, at 143; Seldin 19-311 2d ST, supra note 225, at 1.
227
BOE, supra note 131, at 110:7-10; Ex. 1, supra note 131, at 423–25, 429-30; Ex. 2, supra note 131, at 303;
Ex. 50, supra note 131, at 14-24; BOE, supra note 131, at 65:10-66:25. Significantly, the district court recognized
double recovery is a proper ground to challenge an arbitration award (citing Priority One Servs., Inc. v. W&T
Travel Servs., LLC, 825 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2011)); see also AS Brief, supra note 136, at 21, 34–35 (citing
Transcript in Case No. A-19-310 dated April 2, 2019 (Image ID A00102628NSC) (“Seldin T”) at 138).
228
Seldin v. Est. of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185, 207, 939 N.W.2d 768, 787 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2622,
209 L. Ed. 2d 751 (2021). Since Seldin, the Nebraska Supreme Court has acknowledged the split in authority on
this issue. City of Omaha v. Pro. Firefighters Ass’n, 309 Neb. 918, 938–39, 963 N.W.2d 1 (2021) (noting
“[w]hether arbitration awards governed by the FAA can be vacated on the grounds that the arbitrator manifestly
disregarded the law is a question on which courts have diverged” and, citing Seldin, explained it “recently sided
with” those courts that find “an arbitration award may not be vacated on the grounds that the arbitrator manifestly
disregarded the law”).
229
Seldin, 305 Neb. at 202, 939 N.W.2d at 784 n.25 (citing Medicine Shoppe Int’l. v. Turner Invs., 614 F.3d 485
(8th Cir. 2010)). Seldin did not discuss a later Eighth Circuit case, Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l, v. Trans States
Airlines, 638 F.3d 572, 579 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 749–
50 (8th Cir. 1986), which noted “manifest disregard of the law and public policy [are] distinct exceptions[.]”).
230
Medicine Shoppe Int’l., 614 F.3d at 488 (citing Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 582
(2008)).
231
Seldin, 305 Neb. at 207, 939 N.W.2d at 787. Seldin cites the Supreme Court decision in E. Associated Coal
Corp. v. Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57(2000), for an unrelated point and apparently did not review subsequent
caselaw history that connects that decision to FAA case authorities finding the public-policy exception “survives
Hall Street.” See Titan Tire Corp. of Freeport, Inc. v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy,
Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union, 734 F.3d at 716-17 & n.8 (citing Affymax, Inc. v. Ortho-McNeilJanssen Pharms., Inc., 660 F.3d 281 (7th Cir. 2011) (FAA case)). On the other hand, the Nebraska Supreme Court
in Pro. Firefighters Ass’n correctly recognized the “narrow” exception on public policy allowed by E. Associated
Coal Corp. and, citing Seldin, intimated that Seldin also did not join courts finding a public policy exception after
Hall Street. Pro. Firefighters Ass’n, 309 Neb. at 942.
232
Seldin, 305 Neb. at 205–207, 939 N.W.2d at 785-87.
233
Luciano v. Tchrs. Ins. and Annuity Assoc. of Am., No. 15-6726, 2021 WL 1663712, *2 n.2 (D.N.J. Apr. 28,
2021) (“Since [Hall Street], a circuit split has emerged regarding the manifest disregard of the law doctrine . . . .”)
(citations omitted).
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under the FAA remained an open question after Hall Street.234 The Nebraska Supreme Court
also did not comment on the separate, but equally clear, court split on the issue of whether a
public policy exception survived Hall Street,235 and thus did not recognize its decision may
represent a minority view.236 Arizona Seldins’ argument on the public policy exception237 was
among those cited in support of awarding further attorney fees as a sanction. 238
Interim Award Applications. The district court ruled interim award applications filed
in the district court did not have a “legal basis”239 because a precise case sought by the district
court had not been cited240 and further because the applications allegedly ran counter to a “chief
concern” of the parties to avoid piecemeal actions in the district court. 241 But the district court
did not mention that the requested case was provided242 or discuss highly relevant views of
several United States Supreme Court Justices in Stolt-Nielsen,243 or note that an immediate stay

234

Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 672 n.3 (2010) (“We do not decide whether
‘manifest disregard’ survives our decision in [Hall Street]”).
235
Caputo v. Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC, No. 19-17204, 2020 WL 2786934, at *3 (D.N.J. May 29, 2020)
(“[T]he Circuit Courts of Appeals have . . . disagreed on whether the public policy exception continues to serve
as cognizable means for challenging an arbitration award”).
236
See supra notes 102–103; see also Seldin, 305 Neb. at 205-207, 939 N.W.2d at 785-87.
237
Gulf Coast Indus. Workers Union v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 991 F.2d 244, 248 n.5 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[C]ourts are
the ultimate arbiters of public policy, not arbitrators”).
238
Seldin, 305 Neb. at 209–213, 939 N.W.2d at 788–90. See Omaha Seldins’ AF Brief, supra note 136, at 8
(“The Arizona Seldins’ refusal to apply this Court’s precedents in good faith also extends to their argument that
‘public policy’ was an available ground for vacatur under the FAA”); see also AS Brief, supra note 136, at 35;
see also https://www.nebraska.gov/courts/sccales/index.cgi (disposition dated August 26, 2020, awarding
additional attorney fees sustained in the total sum of $50,000).
239
See, e.g., Seldin 2d ST, supra note 175, at 1–2, 26–27; Ex. 60-A, supra note 131, at 13 (citing In re Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 419 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. App. 2010) as on “one side of disparate authority”).
240
The district court sought a very specific case in which an award “both the parties and the Arbitrator intended
to be non-final was treated as a final, appealable arbitration award.” Seldin 19-311 2d ST, supra note 225, at 68.
But an incomplete response would not be determinative of attorney fees. See City of Omaha v. Pro. Firefighters
Ass’n, 309 Neb. 918, 948 (2021) (noting “arguments that the arbitration award should have been vacated lacked
merit” does not mean a position is “so lacking in merit to be deemed frivolous”); First Nat’l. Bank of Omaha v.
Acceptance Ins. Cos., Inc., 12 Neb. App. 353, 377, 675 N.W.2d 689, 707 (2004) (“[I]t is rare that litigated issues
without merit are also frivolous”).
241
Seldin T, supra note 227, at 1; Seldin 19-311 2d ST, supra note 225, at 31.
242
Ex. 60-C, supra note 131, at 1 (citing Am. Intl. Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Allied Cap. Corp., 167 A.D. 3d
142, 86 N.Y.S. 3d 472 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) (finding it had jurisdiction to rule on a partial award even though
the arbitrators found: (1) the parties did not agree to an immediate appeal of the partial award as would occur in
a bifurcated proceeding; and (2) the arbitrators intended the partial award to be non-final). Like Dorothy in Wizard
of Oz, the triumph in meeting the district court’s challenge by delivering what appeared to be the requested case
did not result in a granted request. Paul Rudoff, The Wizard of Oz Movie Script, THE WIZARD OF OZ -- MOVIE
SCRIPT, http://www.wendyswizardofoz.com/printablescript.htm (last visited August 22, 2021) (“Bring me her
broomstick, and I’ll grant your requests”).
243
Ex. 60-B, supra note 131, at 2 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 691–92
(2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens & Breyer, JJ.) (noting the Supreme Court needs to provide
more “definitive guidance” on when a partial award is considered final for jurisdictional purposes because “lower
court opinions are . . . divided”). See also Ex. 60-A, supra note 131, at 13 (citing Schatt v. Aventura Limousine
& Transp. Serv., Inc., 603 F. App’x 881, 886 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting “[i]t falls to [the court] to determine if [an]
Interim Award was a ‘final’ arbitration award under the meaning of the FAA”).
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order was in fact entered completely averting any piecemeal action by the parties or the district
court.244
On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the district court’s ruling on the
interim award applications,245 but it did not fully evaluate caselaw advanced by Scott
(Chevron)246 or, similar to the district court, discuss the important observations of three
Supreme Court Justices on this subject (Stolt-Nielsen).247 It also sought to distinguish other
authority cited by Scott (Allied Capital) on a ground not squarely at issue in the proceeding.248
The Nebraska Supreme Court further did not comment, when conducting its own jurisdictional
review,249 that an agreement by the parties purporting to declare when a court has jurisdiction
to hear a case is a legal nullity.250 And similarly, for jurisdiction purposes, it did not address
that a legal decision found by a Nebraska tribunal to be law-of-the-case is co-extensive with a
final order, which presumptively triggers the time clock for appeal under Nebraska law. 251
Attorney Fees. The district court did not credit Arizona Seldins with making
reasonable arguments, despite the existence of conflicting decisions in lower courts on several

244

Seldin 2d ST, supra note 175, at 65-67, 76.
Seldin v. Est. of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185, 213, 939 N.W.2d 768, 790 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2622,
209 L. Ed. 2d 751 (2021).
246
Id., 305 Neb. at 212–213, 939 N.W.2d at 790 (citing In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 419 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. App.
2010)). The district court found Chevron “lacked evidence” that the parties or arbitrators “agreed or intended”
interim awards to be “nonfinal and non-appealable.” Id., 305 Neb. at 212–213, 939 N.W.2d at 790. However, the
parties in Chevron had an express agreement that only a single award would be entered. See Scott CA Brief,
supra note 136, at 34. Despite that agreement for a single award, the arbitrator entered eight interim awards and
Chevron found two of them to be barred under the FAA because they were not timely appealed. See Scott CA
Brief, supra note 136, at 34.
247
Scott’s CA Brief, supra note 136, at 34
248
The Nebraska Supreme Court found Allied Capital to be “clearly distinguishable” because it determined the
parties there agreed and “requested . . . a final determination on one of the issues” to be made in a partial decision.
Seldin, 305 Neb. at 213, 939 N.W.2d at 790. That reading of the factual record, however, was not accepted by
the New York Court of Appeals shortly after Seldin was decided: “[T]he record is devoid of any evidence that
the parties . . . mutually agreed to . . . a partial decision.” American Int’l. Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Allied
Capital Corp., 35 N.Y.3d 64, 67, 149 N.E.3d 33, 125 N.Y.S.3d 340 (N.Y. 2020). Moreover, the central point of
Allied Capital is the finding that a court has unrestricted power to completely ignore an arbitrator’s statement
about whether an award is non-final: “[T]his court is not bound by the [arbitrators’] statements . . . that the [partial
final award] was not final.” Allied Capital, 167 A.D.3d at 148, 86 N.Y.S.3d at 4. That determination was not
disturbed by the New York Court of Appeals on further appeal after Seldin. Allied Capital, 167 A.D.3d at 148,
86 N.Y.S.3d at 4.
249
Seldin, 305 Neb. at 198, 939 N.W.2d at 782 (noting “it is the power and duty of an appellate court to determine
whether it has jurisdiction” independent of any argument presented or omitted by the parties); see also Karo v.
Nau Country Ins. Co., 297 Neb. 798, 820, 901 N.W.2d 689, 704 (2017) (“3-month notice requirement . . . is
jurisdictional . . . under the FAA to vacate the arbitration award . . . .”).
250
DeLima v. Tsevi, 301 Neb. 933, 945–46, 921 N.W.2d 89, 98 (2018) (“[P]arties cannot confer subject matter
jurisdiction upon judicial tribunal by either acquiescence or consent, nor may subject matter jurisdiction be
created by waiver, estoppel, consent, or conduct of parties”).
251
Jill B. v. State, 297 Neb. 57, 64, 899 N.W.2d 241, 248 (2017) (“[T]he law-of-the-case doctrine requires a
final order”).
245
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issues in the litigation.252 It also did not find merit in a few unique legal challenges made by
Arizona Seldins, including their objection to the arbitrator’s award of one million dollars in
legal expenses prohibited by the separation agreement 253 or their request to correct a mistaken
award of hundreds of thousands of dollars in prejudgment interest, which the arbitrator did not
explain in a reasoned award required by agreement of the parties. 254
The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the district court’s award of post-arbitration
attorney fees as sanctions and increased the amount of fees in the district court to reflect the
total sought.255 The Nebraska Supreme Court, again, did not discuss Monster Energy in which
the Ninth Circuit, among other things, reversed and vacated an award of post-arbitration
attorney fees when addressing similar arguments.256 Even though, according to the district
252

The district court awarded sanctions based in part on a claimed absence of legal support for “evident
partiality,” but did not discuss the question in context of the significant court split on the applicable standard of
review. Seldin 2d ST, supra note 175, at 62; Seldin 19-311 2d ST, supra note 225, at 64 (finding Arizona Seldins
allegation the arbitrator “engaged in misconduct by accepting a ‘tender’ of the Sky Financial Securities as a form
of interpleader . . . was meritless and frivolous”).
253
The district court found Arizona Seldins “should not have raised” an argument in response to the arbitrator
awarding more than one million dollars in attorney fees as statutory damages, even though the separation
agreement expressly states: “each Party shall bear its own . . . legal fees and expenses.” Seldin ST, supra note
151, at 121; Seldin, 305 Neb. at 192, 208, 939 N.W.2d at 788. Arizona Seldins presented “indistinguishable”
legal authority showing a veteran federal judge, using identical reasoning, vacated an award of attorney fees as
damages under a state “statute” because, like Seldin, the arbitration agreement provided the parties were to “bear
their own attorneys’ fees.” Ex. 60-A, supra note 131, at 3; Ex. 60-B, supra note 131, at 1–2 (citing Sabre GLBL,
Inc. v. Shan, No. 15-CV-8900, 2018 WL 1905802, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 23, 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and
remanded sub nom. Sabre GLBL, Inc v. Shan, 779 F. App’x 843 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding “[b]y including this
provision, the parties restricted the arbitrator’s authority to award attorney fees . . . regardless of whether the fees
are awarded pursuant to an out-of-state tort statute”). The district court in Seldin suggested “important” language
was “omitted” from Arizona Seldins’ argument related to Sabre GLBL, but the claimed omission had no relevance
to the common issue of the two cases. Seldin 19-311 2d ST, supra note 225, at 59–60. Neither Arizona Seldins
nor the district court in Sabre GLBL prevailed on this point, but there is no indication the Third Circuit found the
ruling of the federal judge to be frivolous. See generally Sabre GLBL, Inc., 779 Fed. App’x 843. Indeed, the
federal judge in Sabre GLBL was not alone in his view. Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 118 P.3d 141, 149-50, 141
Idaho 809, 817–18 (2005) (“[A] general entitlement to an award of attorney’s fees under [state statute] will not
override a valid agreement . . . In this case the parties contracted for a zero dollar amount . . . of attorney’s fees”)
(citation omitted).
254
Arizona Seldins argued the arbitrator made a material miscalculation of prejudgment interest under Arizona
law. Seldin ST, supra note 151, at 120. The applicable statute, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1201, has two
adjacent provisions, but only one could possibly apply as Arizona Seldins explained: “[The arbitrator’s act of
selecting an interest rate from a book or code does not involve an arbitrator’s evaluation of witnesses or
discretionary review of substantive evidence [but] . . . merely involves locating a posted rate in a statute.” Ex.
53-A, supra note 131, at 25–26 (citing Metzler v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, Inc., 235 Ariz.
141, 143, 329 P.3d 1043 (2014)). The district court acknowledged a similar mistake in reviewing two adjacent
statutes in this action. Seldin 19-311 2d ST, supra note 225, at 61 (“In the Order, the Court stated that attorney
fees were awarded pursuant to NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-834 . . . . However, . . . it is patently obvious that the Court
intended . . . NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-824”). Beyond these closely relatable circumstances, there is case authority
showing a court may make a correction under 9 U.S.C. § 11(a), even when an arbitrator has “denied” a request
to do so. See Turquoise Props. Gulf, Inc. v. Overmyer, 81 So. 3d 1250, 1253-57 (Ala. 2011) (cited in Scott AF
Brief, supra note 136, at 6).
255
Seldin v. Est. of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185, 212, 939 N.W.2d 768, 709 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2622,
209 L. Ed. 2d 751 (2021); see also https://www.nebraska.gov/courts/sccales/index.cgi, dated August 26, 2020
(additional attorney fees sustained in the total sum of $50,000).
256
Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130, 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 207
L. Ed. 2d 1100 (2020).
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court, Arizona Seldins presented argument over a period of a few hours on five issues, all of
which were based on the FAA, and related to one subject, Sky Financial, the Nebraska Supreme
Court agreed with the district court that the post-arbitration proceedings had turned “into a relitigation of the Arbitration itself,” which had taken place over nearly two months.257
E.
1.

Seldin Analysis

Evident Partiality: Arbitrator’s Disclosure Would Have Obviated Problem

Arizona Seldins were entitled to receive the benefit of their bargain in selecting
Nebraska law258 to govern the separation agreement for the arbitration in Nebraska, 259 including
the wisdom of Nebraska law that judges and arbitrators are held to the same ethical standards
if they have an interest in a case.260 The Nebraska Supreme Court in Seldin “rejected a ‘judicial
ethics’” standard when analyzing “evident partiality” under the FAA based on a precedent
undergirded by the concurring, not majority, opinion in Commonwealth Coatings.261 The
Nebraska Supreme Court in Seldin found such authority blocked and foreclosed application of
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-739(1)(a), a statute that requires written consent of waiver and the writing
to be made part of the proceeding, because it found a judicial ethics rule does not apply to cases
under the FAA.262
Under the majority opinion in Commonwealth Coatings, however, the Nebraska
Supreme Court was not prohibited from using the Nebraska statute because it embodied judicial
ethics; indeed, the opposite is true. Commonwealth Coatings expressly embraced a “canon of
judicial ethics” in the majority opinion, finding it is an appropriate basis for evaluating evident
partiality of an arbitrator.263
Under principles of federalism recognized in Hall Street, the Nebraska Supreme
Court’s prior “instruction” that judges and arbitrators are subject to the “same” ethical standards
meant Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-739(1)(a) was applicable to the Nebraska arbitration in Seldin,

257

Seldin, 305 Neb. at 95, 212, 939 N.W.2d at 780, 790.
Under Nebraska law, an “arbitration proceeding” is considered “similar to a judicial or quasi-judicial
proceeding.” Kloch v. Ratcliffe, 221 Neb. 241, 245, 375 N.W.2d 916, 919 (1985).
259
Scott CA Brief, supra note 136, at 20, 31; Scott AF Brief, supra note 136, at 3.
260
Seldin, 305 Neb. at 203–04 n.29, 939 N.W.2d at 785 (citing AS Brief, supra note 136, at 24, quoting Barnett v.
City of Scottsbluff, 268 Neb. 555, 684 N.W.2d 553 (2004)). See State v. Pattno, 254 Neb. 733, 739, 579 N.W.2d
503, 507 (1998) (“We noted that judges and arbitrators were both subject to the same ethical standards and
proceeded to address whether an arbitrator’s failure to disclose a possible conflict of interest proved bias or
prejudice against one party”).
261
Seldin, 305 Neb. at 204 n.30, 939 N.W.2d at 785 (quoting Dowd v. First Omaha Sec. Corp., 242 Neb. 347,
495 N.W.2d 36, 42 (1993) (adopting “have to conclude” standard in Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist.
Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 83–84 (2d Cir. 1984), which based its decision on the concurring
opinion of Justice White in Commonwealth Coatings and referred to the majority opinion in Commonwealth
Coatings as a “plurality opinion”); but see Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994)
(“Commonwealth Coatings is not a plurality opinion . . .”). See Scott AF Brief, supra note 136, at 10.
262
Seldin, 305 Neb. at 204 n.30, 939 N.W.2d at 785 (quoting Dowd, 242 Neb. at 204 n.30, 495 N.W.2d at 42).
263
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l. Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150–51 (1968) (citing with approval
“canon of judicial ethics [because it] rest[s] on the premise that any tribunal permitted by law to try cases and
controversies not only must be unbiased but also must avoid even the appearance of bias”).
258
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resulting in the arbitrator becoming “disqualified.”264 A finding of arbitrator disqualification
based on a Nebraska state law canon of “judicial ethics” is authorized by Commonwealth
Coatings and would thus support a conclusion of “evident partiality” by the arbitrator at least
relating to Sky Financial.
The Nebraska law requirement that “consent” be secured from “the parties” shows
that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-739(1)(a) is made to protect clients, not their lawyers. By effectively
mandating the writing be marked as an exhibit in the arbitration proceeding (“consent . . . in
writing . . . made part of the record”), the procedure promotes transparency, ensures honesty
and enhances efficiency. As designed by the Nebraska Legislature, there will not be any
question in a post-arbitration appeal about waiver if the mandatory procedure in Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 24-739(1)(a) is explicitly followed.265 Nebraska courts have enforced this law.266
Strict adherence to Nebraska law by the arbitrator in Seldin would have avoided any
controversy. If the arbitrator had sought “guidance” from the parties267 after privately
determining he had “individually” acquired interests in Sky Financial that he needed to release
and disclaim,268 Arizona Seldins, at minimum, could have insisted the arbitrator order the
interpleader to be pursued and conducted in the district court as permitted by the separation
agreement.269 If so, there would not have been any ownership conflict because a district court
judge in an interpleader action only takes control, not title, of any property deposited into the
court registry and makes a “distribution” of same. A district court judge would not consider
interpleaded property to be “individually” owned by him or her, or deem it to be a personal

264

Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008).
Cisneros v. Graham, 294 Neb. 83, 101, 881 N.W.2d 878, 890 (2016) (“If a statute requires written authority
for a particular transaction, oral ratification will not validate” it) (citation omitted).
266
When a judge has a disqualifying interest in a case by virtue of participation that theoretically could favor or
aid one of the parties and there has not been a “waiver of such disqualification ‘as required by statute,’” the judge
is automatically disqualified and every prior ruling made by the judge, even those made before his or her interest
arose, is “void.” Harrington v. Hayes Cnty., 81 Neb. 231, 235, 115 N.W.773, 774 (1908); State v. Vidales, 6 Neb.
Ct. App. 163, 175–76, 571 N.W.2d 117, 125 (1997) (vacating as “void and of no effect” and not a “mere
formality” a judge’s order entered even before he discovered his wife, a deputy county attorney, had filed
pleadings in the case); cf. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Neb. v. Wozny, 206 Neb. 639, 644, 294 N.W.2d 363, 366
(1980) (finding judge did not have an actual interest in a “case” due to an insurance policy obtained from the
insurer before events involved and unrelated to the case where “neither party objected” after full disclosure of
the judge’s precise interest had been explained).
267
The arbitrator stated he would seek “guidance” from the parties before entering the final award, but he did
not raise the issue of his personal ownership in Sky Financial before the final award or discuss having the parties
pursue the interpleader in the district court. Scott CA Brief, supra note 136, at 25.
268
Omaha Seldins did not dispute, in response to Scott’s arguments, the arbitrator had been impacted by a “belief
and concern about his personal ownership in Sky Financial,” had a growing “undisclosed discomfort with Sky
Financial ownership” and was “uneasy” after accepting Sky Financial ownership, all of which resulted in the
arbitrator taking the “additional and extraordinary step of including a personal legal conveyance in the body of
the Final Award.” Id. at 14, 27–28; OS Brief, supra note 136, at 1–75.
269
The separation agreement provides in pertinent part:
“The obligation to submit a dispute to . . . the [arbitrator] . . . shall not be binding . . . with respect to . . . equitable
procedures in a court . . . to obtain interim relief . . . to preserve the status quo . . . pending resolution by the
[arbitrator] of the actual dispute . . . Venue . . .will be in the District Court of Douglas County, Nebraska.”
Ex. 5-E, supra note 131, at § 9.14.3(a).
265
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asset that would require the judge to formally disclaim and release his or her personal interest
in the property.270
The interpleader in Seldin involved an irrevocable transfer of Sky Financial by
Omaha Seldins, which meant it would never be returned to them and thus ensure Arizona
Seldins would not be subject to risk of double or triple recovery.271 The prejudice to Arizona
Seldins in the arbitration relating to Sky Financial was material from a financial standpoint
since they went from dollars-ahead winners to seven-figure losers in the arbitration.272 That
result would have been different if the Nebraska “judicial ethics” statute authorized by the
majority opinion in Commonwealth Coatings for evaluating “evident partiality” had been
accepted and applied.
Arizona Seldins raised Monster Energy to the Nebraska Supreme Court because it is
factually similar and legally indistinguishable from Seldin.273 The arbitrator in Monster Energy
openly disclosed to participants his “interest” in the arbitration based on his official capacity as
arbitrator overseeing the arbitration, but he withheld disclosure of his knowledge of his
personal “ownership” in the arbitration service involved and that fact was not discovered until
after the final award.274
The factual circumstances in Seldin are closely analogous. The arbitrator in Seldin
openly disclosed to Arizona Seldins his “interest” in Sky Financial in his official capacity “as
arbitrator,” but he withheld disclosure of his knowledge of his personal “ownership” in Sky
Financial and that fact was not discovered until the final award.275 Like the arbitrator in Monster
Energy, the arbitrator’s action in Seldin at best constituted an insufficient “partial disclosure.”276
The arbitrator’s description of his “jurisdiction” as a role akin to an “officer of the court” in
Seldin also is substantively the same as the arbitrator in Monster Energy who “likened his
interest” to “‘each JAMS neutral.’” Id.277
The critical legal lesson gained from Monster Energy and Seldin also is the same. In
both cases, the arbitrator’s personal ownership interest was the “crucial fact” and, in both
instances, disclosure of that fact was not made by the arbitrator and remained unknown until
after the final award.278 The cases reached polar opposite results only because the standards of

270

See, e.g., Ehlers v. Perry, 242 Neb. 208, 494 N.W.2d 325 (1993) (noting interpleader action was filed “to
determine distribution” of fund paid into court, not a conveyance of individual ownership of an asset to the judge).
271
In Nebraska, a party interpleading property represents it has “no interest” in the subject-matter. Strasser v.
Com. Nat’l Bank, 157 Neb. 570, 573, 60 N.W.2d 672, 674 (1953) (“It is the essence of an interpleader . . . that
the party invoking the remedy shall be entirely indifferent . . ., asserting no interest in himself in the subject
matter of the dispute”). Ex. 1, supra note 131, at 13, 48–50; Ex. 11, supra note 131, at 2.
272
Ex. 1, supra note 131, at 342, 463–66, 470; Ex. 1, supra note 131, at 466–67 (noting award in Arizona Seldins’
favor of $2,101,178); Seldin v. Est. of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185, 192, 939 N.W.2d 768, 778 (2020), cert. denied,
141 S. Ct. 2622, 209 L. Ed. 2d 751 (2021) (noting “$1,962,528 in damages [awarded to Omaha Seldins] for their
lost corporate opportunities claims[.]”).
273
Seldin, 305 Neb. at 204, 939 N.W.2d at 785 (“have to conclude”) and Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages,
LLC, 940 F.3d 1130, 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 207 L. Ed. 2d 1100 (2020) (“reasonable impression
of bias”).
274
Monster Energy, 940 F.3d at 1133–37.
275
Ex. 1, supra note 131, at 462–63.
276
Monster Energy, 940 F.3d at 1134.
277
Id.; Seldin, 305 Neb. at 202, 939 N.W.2d at 784.
278
Monster Energy, 940 F.3d at 1135.
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review used by the two courts are manifestly different and outcome determinative. 279
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court was unable280 to accept review in either case.281
Between Monster Energy and Seldin, the Ninth Circuit’s rule of “reasonable
impression of bias” closely tracks Commonwealth Coatings,282 while the opposing “have to
conclude” rule adopted in Seldin and by other courts on its side of the split is not found
anywhere in Commonwealth Coatings, not even in Justice White’s concurrence.283
At bottom, as it applies to “evident partiality” in Seldin, there is a difference between
a judge or arbitrator during a formal hearing announcing he or she has “jurisdiction” in an
official capacity to perform a legal procedure (“act of interpleading”) related to a statutory
defense (“tender”), while acting in a role as or similar to an “officer of the court,” and, on the
other hand, a circumstance, as in Seldin, where an arbitrator or judge privately determines he
or she “individually” acquired personal ownership of the property in dispute during the
proceeding and indicates a need to formally disclaim and release such interest in the final award
or judgment to avoid the consequences of personal ownership.284
2.

Waiver: Constructive Knowledge is Insufficient Regarding Personal Ownership

In Seldin, the specific challenged action—the arbitrator’s acceptance of Sky Financial
ownership in his personal capacity—was not disclosed or explained to Arizona Seldins before
the final award.285 Moreover, if the arbitrator intended the term “interpleader” to have a
different meaning286 than how it is used under governing Nebraska law, such an interpretation
279
A Ninth Circuit panel has reaffirmed Monster Energy. See EHM Prods., Inc. v. Starline Tours of Hollywood,
Inc., 1 F. 4th 1164 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Monster Energy only requires disclosure when an arbitrator holds an
ownership interest in JAMS and JAMS engages in nontrivial business dealings with a party to the arbitration”).
280
Seldin appeared to generate significant interest. SCOTUSblog identified Seldin as one of five cases out of
230 worth “watching.” See Seldin v. Est. of Silverman, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/seldin-v-estate-of-silverman/ (last accessed December 20, 2021). See also Sarah Biser, U.S. Supreme
Court Declines To Review Whether The Federal Arbitration Act Forecloses Public-Policy Challenges To
Arbitration Award, JD SUPRA (June 17, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/u-s-supreme-court-declinesto-review-4498197/ (discussing Seldin).
281
Monster Energy, 940 F.3d at 1135–36; Seldin v. Est. of Silverman, 141 S. Ct. 2622, 209 L. Ed. 2d 751 (2021).
The Supreme Court should consider resolving the standard of review for evident partiality in a case similar to
Monster Energy or Seldin in which the “[c]rucial fact” to be decided is narrow and based on personal ownership
or a direct financial interest of the arbitrator. Monster Energy, 940 F.3d at 1135. In that way, the Supreme Court
will be able to resolve the longstanding conflict as to the proper standard of review for evident partiality in a
clean case, unobstructed by the messiness involved when trying to unravel knotty facts, or in dissecting nuanced
professional relationships between parties, their counsel and arbitrators, as is often required in typical arbitration
nondisclosure cases.
282
Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 149 (“any dealings that might create impression of possible bias”).
283
Id. at 152 (White J., concurring) (stating only that “more than trivial business with a party . . . must be
disclosed”).
284
Ex. 5, supra note 131, at 5-7; Ex. 10, supra note 131, at 70-71; Ex. 1-QQ, supra note 131, at 462–63, 483.
285
Scott CA Brief, supra note 136, at 31 (“The Arbitrator did not consider the transfer of Sky Financial to be an
act of interpleading, but instead found it to be a conveyance of property to him personally and a transaction that
he felt compelled to disavow and unwind in the Final Award after seven months of ownership”).
286
Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass makes the same point. Humpty Dumpty stated: “‘When I use a
word,’ . . . ‘it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.’” Alice mused, “The question is
whether you can make words mean so many different things,” to which Humpty Dumpty said: “The question is,
which is to be master — that’s all.” LEWIS CAROL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 99 (1917).
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also was not disclosed or explained by the arbitrator and the unfamiliar procedure, as Arizona
Seldins explained, amounted to a “secret” interpleader287 to which Arizona Seldins should not
reasonably have been found to have consented.”288
Respectfully, once the faux interpleader in Seldin is removed from the analysis, the
only waiver issue for the Nebraska Supreme Court to address is whether the arbitrator strictly
complied with the “writing” and “record” requirements of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-739(1)(a),289
which the record shows were not met.290 Because Omaha Seldins had represented to the
arbitrator the ownership transfer of Sky Financial was made “irrevocably” and
“unconditionally,”291 they could not, as the party invoking the interpleader, later reacquire or
assert any interest in Sky Financial, but the record shows they did.292
Waiver should not be found without specific knowledge of the precise conflict, at
least when it comes to “evident partiality” based on personal ownership or financial interest of
the arbitrator. In Commonwealth Coatings, the Supreme Court, while ordering the arbitration
award to be set aside,293 found “no reason” to suspect “any improper motives” of the
arbitrator,294 even though it found the arbitrator had a relationship with “the very projects
involved in th[e] lawsuit.”295 Commonwealth Coatings indicated good faith of the arbitrator is
not enough, however, explaining that courts “should, if anything, be even more scrupulous to
safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators than judges.”296 The Supreme Court also specifically
found “highly significant” an arbitration rule that requires a “writing” from both parties before
either could be found to “waive” a circumstance that creates a presumption of bias or “might”
disqualify the arbitrator.297
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Monster Energy reflects a similar view of waiver. The
arbitrator identified in Monster Energy is described as a distinguished retired state court
judge298 who may “not have subjectively believe[d] there was any reason his owner status

287

Scott CA Brief, supra note 136, at 24.
The Nebraska Supreme Court found Arizona Seldins’ consent contemplated the Sky Financial “asset” would
be delivered to the “appropriate party,” but the written assignments provide Omaha Seldins had “irrevocably and
unconditionally” transferred Sky Financial and that it would never be returned to them. Ex. 5, supra note 131, at
5–7; Ex. 10, supra note 131, at 70–72; Seldin v. Est. of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185, 192, 201–02, 939 N.W.2d 768,
778, 784 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2622, 209 L. Ed. 2d 751 (2021).
289
Ex. 1-A, supra note 131, at § 9.10. (noting that “Scott signed and consented to” certain “irrevocable
assignments”).
290
Seldin, 305 Neb. at 203-204, 939 N.W.2d at 785.
291
Ex. 10, supra note 131, at 72.
292
Ex. 1, supra note 131, at 463; Ex. 7, supra note 131, at 172; Ex. 51, supra note 131, at 9; Strasser v. Com.
Nat’l Bank, 60 N.W.2d 672, 673–74 (1953) (“It is the essence of an interpleader under section 25–325,
R.R.S.1943, as it was under the common-law bill of interpleader, that the party invoking the remedy shall be
entirely indifferent to the conflicting claims, asserting no interest in himself in the subject matter of the dispute”).
293
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 147 (1968).
294
Id.
295
Id. at 146.
296
Id. at 149.
297
Id.
298
Hon. John W. Kennedy, Jr. (Ret.), JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/kennedy/ (last accessed December 20,
2021).
288
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would in any way bias him in favor of either party.”299 A similar conclusion could be made
regarding the arbitrator in Seldin,300 but the result in Monster Energy also should be the same.301
As previously noted, without any advance notice, and much to the surprise of Arizona Seldins,
the arbitrator privately determined during the arbitration before the final award that he needed
to include a release and disclaimer in the final award302 based on his personal ownership of Sky
Financial.303 The arbitrator’s personal ownership of Sky Financial was not a fact known to
Arizona Seldins before the final award and should not constitute “constructive waiver” of
“evident partiality” in the absence of showing strict compliance with statutory requirements for
waiver.304
3.

Public Policy and Manifest Disregard of the Law: Proper Narrow Exceptions

Public policy and manifest disregard of the law should be allowed in limited
circumstances as narrow and exceptional grounds for a court to vacate an arbitration award.
Adherence to principles of federalism and the general dictates of Hall Street strongly support
this conclusion. There is no evidence or justified concern that acceptance of these two thin reeds
for judicial consideration will cause arbitration review to swell into giant tree trunks obstructing
the path to a quick and efficient resolution of disputes. In jurisdictions that recognize these
grounds to vacate awards, challenges are rarely successful.305 The onerous standards that a party
must meet, coupled with the healthy skepticism of judges, will ensure these exceptions remain
infrequent. But their mere existence, regardless of the likelihood of success, is meaningful to
abate an otherwise troubling perception of arbitration as an illegitimate dispute resolution
method.
The Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Henderson,306 provides a good
illustration of the public policy exception. In Henderson, the Nebraska Supreme Court refused
to confirm an award reinstating a known member of the Ku Klux Klan to his position as a police
299

Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130, 1132 (9th Cir. 2019) (Hon. John W. Kennedy,
Jr.); see also Heather Cameron, supra note 63, at 2261 (“Judge Kennedy likely did not disclose his ownership
interest because he did not subjectively believe there was any reason his owner status would in any way bias him
in favor of either party”).
300
Seldin v. Est. of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185, 204, 939 N.W.2d 768, 785 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2622,
209 L. Ed. 2d 751 (2021). (“No evidence that the arbitrator engaged in . . . partiality”).
301
Monster Energy, 940 F.3d at 1133–37.
302
Ex. 1-QQ, supra note 131, at 462–63 (final award).
303
The arbitrator did not explain in the final award the basis on which he decided, or precisely when he
determined, he had acquired a personal ownership interest in Sky Financial. The arbitrator may have privately
concluded, without disclosure to Arizona Seldins, that neither an arbitrator nor the parties could create or
recognize a non-statutory interpleader that allows an arbitrator to officially own property. Compare Marsch v.
Williams, 23 Cal. App. 4th 238, 248, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 402 (1994) (“In sum, the precedents we have examined
strongly suggest we are not at liberty to create or recognize a nonstatutory receiver, even where the parties have
agreed to the appointment of one”), with AAA rules, Ex. 11., supra note 131 (“Unless the parties so request, an
arbitrator should not appoint himself or herself to a separate office related to the subject matter of the dispute,
such as receiver or trustee, nor should a panel of arbitrators appoint one of their number to such an office”).
304
Seldin, 305 Neb. at 203-204, 939 N.W.2d at 785.
305
Jones v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 991 F.3d 614, 615 (5th Cir. 2021) (“For a time, we did recognize manifest
disregard as its own basis for setting aside an arbitration award, though that standard was ‘difficult to satisfy’”)
(quoting Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 354 (5th Cir. 2009)).
306
State v. Henderson, 277 Neb. 204, 762 N.W.2d 1, 3 (2009).
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officer.307 The award was governed by the Nebraska Uniform Arbitration Act 308 (“NUAA”),
which, like the FAA, does not explicitly provide for vacatur on public-policy grounds; the
Nebraska Supreme Court nonetheless applied the common-law exception based on the federal
W.R. Grace trio of cases.309 Since Seldin was decided, the Nebraska Supreme Court has
provided additional clarity to demonstrate how exceedingly narrow the public policy exception
to enforcement of an arbitration award under the NUAA must be before it is found to apply. 310
The question in Seldin was whether the arbitrator’s award of a double/triple recovery
could be vacated on the ground it violated an explicit, well-defined and dominant state public
policy based on the Nebraska Constitution.311 Despite its state constitutional implications, the
Nebraska Supreme Court in Seldin, interpreting Hall Street, felt compelled to answer the
question in the negative and, indeed, added that language in Henderson should not in the future
be construed as authorizing Nebraska courts to vacate awards on public policy grounds
governed by the FAA.312
The Nebraska Supreme Court should not be placed in this position. It is unreasonable
for a Nebraska court to be forced to accept an arbitration award identical to Henderson merely
because the contract invokes interstate commerce and is subject to the FAA. Beyond the
harmful incursion on federalism, Congress did not suggest in enacting the FAA it intended to
withdraw the traditional jurisdiction of state courts to remedy violations of state law in interstate
contracts.313
A clear ruling from the United States Supreme Court recognizing a narrow public
policy exception under the FAA would have led to a different outcome in Seldin. At minimum,
such a rule would have allowed the Nebraska Supreme Court to determine whether the
arbitration award in Seldin violated public policy in awarding a double or triple recovery—
which appeared to be the case314—under the Nebraska Constitution.315

307

Id. at 8–9, 17–18.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2601
309
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Loc. Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766
(1983); see also United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987); see also E.
Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000).
310
City of Omaha v. Pro. Firefighters Ass’n, 309 Neb. 918, 948, 963 N.W.2d 1, 22 (2021). In light of Henderson,
and because its case is governed by the NUAA, the Nebraska Supreme Court in Professional Firefighters likely
did not find it necessary to definitively address the split in authority on whether public policy may be used as a
basis for vacating an arbitration award under the FAA. See, e.g., Caputo v. Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC, No. 1917204, 2020 WL 2786934, at *3 (Dist. Ct. N.J. May 29, 2020).
311
Seldin v. Est. of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185, 207, 939 N.W.2d 768, 787 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2622,
209 L. Ed. 2d 751 (2021).
312
Id.
313
See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 222 (1947).
314
Arizona Seldins also argued the court may modify an award for “double recovery” under 9 U.S.C. § 11(a),
which also includes an underlying issue subject to a circuit split. See AS Brief, supra note 136, at 21; see also
John B. Rich, Arbitrator’s Error and the “Face of the Award” Rule, 24 J. CONSUMER & COMMC’N L. 49, 49
(2020) (noting “widening [of] the split in the circuits”).
315
Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 931, 104 N.W.2d 684, 689–90 (1960) (“[D]amages which double or treble
the actual compensatory damages established[,] are in contravention . . . of the Nebraska Constitution”).
308
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4.

Interim Award Appeals Should Require a “Final Award” Designation
a.

Law-of-the-Case Awards are Presumptively Final

The law-of-the-case doctrine under Nebraska law is coterminous with a “final
order.”316 The Nebraska Supreme Court has long recognized that a failure to timely file an
application to vacate an arbitration award within the three-month period of an arbitration award
renders it time-barred.317 Indeed, the Nebraska Supreme Court has ruled an attorney’s “failure
to challenge an arbitration award within the required time frame,” when joined with a personal
conflict issue, was a proper ground for the court to issue a “public reprimand” against the
attorney for professional misconduct.318
b.

Interim Award Applications in Seldin

The Nebraska Supreme Court in Seldin found, due to the number of claims, each
“involving several independent causes of action” and affirmative defenses, the arbitrator
proposed, and the parties agreed, the arbitrator would “bifurcate” each claim to “address
liability and damage claims in separate hearings” as necessary. 319
During the latter part of the arbitration proceedings, Scott320 filed a few interim award
applications in the district court only in an “abundance of caution” and in a manner to avoid the
parties or the district court from having to take any action until the final award was entered. 321
For example, Scott included in the caption of the first interim award application, “REQUEST
STAY OF ACTION,” in all capitalized and bold letters in an effort to clearly make this
point.322 The parties soon thereafter stipulated to a stay, and the district court approved the
stipulation, completely eliminating any need for action by the parties or district court until after
the final award.
In a closely analogous circumstance, the Fifth Circuit, following an arbitration
decision, found nothing frivolous about a party filing an appeal “in an abundance of caution”
even though the appealing party “acknowledged that [it] might not be the right time” and, after
review, the court “readily conclude[d]” the appeal was “premature.”323

316
Jill B. v. State, 297 Neb. 57, 899 N.W.2d 241, 248 (2017) (“[T]he law-of-the-case doctrine requires a final
order”).
317
Karo v. Nau Country Ins. Co., 297 Neb. 798, 901 N.W.2d 689, 704 (2017) (“3-month notice . . . is
jurisdictional . . . .”).
318
State ex rel. Couns. for Discipline of Neb. Sup. Ct. v. Palagi, 308 Neb. 253, 953 N.W.2d 253, 254–56 (2021)
(“The formal charges generally allege violations stemming from the respondent’s failure to challenge an
arbitration award within the required timeframe . . . The respondent also had a personal conflict of interest . . .
The respondent is publicly reprimanded”).
319
Seldin v. Est. of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185, 191, 939 N.W.2d 768, 777 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2622,
209 L. Ed. 2d 751 (2021).
320
Scott retained appellate counsel during the arbitration in part because it became clear he had separate issues
relating to Sky Financial. BOE, supra note 131, at 202:20–25; Ex. 2, supra note 131, at 228; Ex. 1, supra note
131, at 342, 463–66.
321
Seldin, 305 Neb. at 212, 939 N.W.2d at 790.
322
Seldin 2d ST, supra note 175, at 65–67, 76; Ex. 53-G, supra note 131, at 2.
323
Banca Pueyo SA v. Lone Star Fund IX (US), L.P., 978 F.3d 968, 974 (5th Cir. 2020).
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In evaluating the whether it was reasonable to file interim award applications, the
Nebraska Supreme Court in Seldin did not mention that the FAA specifically authorizes an
appeal of a “partial award” or acknowledge the view that “lower court opinions are . . . divided”
on when a partial award is final for jurisdictional purposes. 324 The Nebraska Supreme Court
also did not address, when conducting its independent review of jurisdiction, authority that
holds an agreement to establish a court’s jurisdiction is a legal nullity, or discuss that a mounting
number of judges have found a failure to appeal an interim award results in a claim becoming
time-barred.325
The rule of finality of interim arbitration awards discussed in Seldin should be
reassessed. If the parties and the arbitrator are authorized to decide—over a court—whether a
ruling is “final-appealable,” they could theoretically “agree” that a given award is not “final
appealable” until 100 days after it is formally issued by the arbitrator. In the event the losing
party would seek to challenge the award after 95 days, contrary to the 100-day agreement, that
party would suffer adverse action based on Seldin, yet the court also would be required to
dismiss the post-arbitration appeal under the FAA because it is more than three months after
the award.326
CONCLUSION
Arbitration offers positive benefits to society and the judiciary. It can serve as a
much-needed ventilator delivering oxygen to federal and state court systems gasping for air due
to overcrowded dockets or in anticipation of expected case spiking. But the cure is worse than
the disease if the general public loses confidence in the arbitration vaccine and decides at the
far extreme that self-administered relief in the streets provides better access to justice.
This contention is not an excess of advocacy. If arbitration becomes, as it is quickly
becoming, the dominant civil justice system the general public truly knows, and that system
allows its “judges,” namely arbitrators, to acquire personal ownership interests in the arbitration
without strict compliance with governing state statutes, or arbitrators are allowed to render
double or triple recovery awards in violation of explicit state public policies in ways that judges
cannot, arbitration will eventually be relegated to be the equivalent of a kangaroo court.
The Supreme Court also should announce a clear rule on when an arbitration award
is final. This is a jurisdictional issue, after all, and it is hornbook law that parties cannot agree
to a court’s jurisdiction no matter how emphatically they assert their claimed right. Arbitration
appeals should not be guided by gotcha treatments only Dr. Frankenstein would prescribe. The
general public, and the attorneys who serve it, should not be forced to guess the jurisprudential
time of demise of a client’s right to appeal of an arbitration award. The rule should be simple:

324
See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 691 (2010) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). The
Nebraska Supreme Court also did not discuss that filing interim award applications guards against a party losing
his or her statutory right to challenge an arbitral decision in the event the arbitrator became unavailable. See Scott
CA Brief, supra note 136, at 16; Scott RH Brief, supra note 136, at 11-12; see also note 121, supra.
325
See supra notes 30–31, 241–45. The Nebraska Supreme Court’s attempt to distinguish decisional law
presented by Scott, including In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 419 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. App. 2010) and Am. Int’l.
Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Allied Cap. Corp., 35 N.Y.3d 64,, 149 N.E.3d 33, 125 N.Y.S.3d 340 (N.Y. 2020),
already has been addressed herein.
326
Karo v. Nau Country Ins. Co., 297 Neb. 798, 805, 901 N.W.2d 689, 704 (2017) (“3-month notice . . . is
jurisdictional . . . .”).
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when an arbitrator includes the capitalized term “Final Award” in the caption of a ruling, the
award is considered final and capable of review by a court. Otherwise, it is not final and cannot
be reviewed. An announced rule of this nature by the Supreme Court would have entirely
avoided any concern or perceived need to file any interim award application in Seldin.
Seldin represents a complex commercial litigation case posing as an arbitration. By
virtue of the length, scope and court rules applied in the underlying arbitral proceeding, 327 the
arbitration review in Seldin could not reasonably have been expected to be speedy or
efficient.328 The parties themselves bargained for complex rules and the arbitration hearing took
months, resulting in an arbitration proceeding the late Justice Scalia observed was not
envisioned by the FAA, or even enforceable under state law. 329
Relief from true arbitration ills cannot be illusory. Congress granted statutory rights
under the FAA to parties in arbitration for a reason. Courts are required to enforce those rights
with equal vigor to their effort to find a basis to confirm an arbitration award. The FAA is not
a statutory placebo and should not be a poison pill.
Arbitration awards are not self-executing. Courts will be involved in addressing an
arbitration award regardless of whether a challenge is made. There is no reason a clearly
unmeritorious request to vacate an arbitration award cannot be disposed of in a single sentence
without more in all but the most egregious circumstances. 330 While awarding attorney fees
against abusive litigants in post-arbitration proceedings may be perceived as providing tough
and needed medicine for those engaging in misconduct, the chilling effect created in others who
decide not to pursue a warranted challenge because of the threat of sanctions is worse. 331

327
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The New Litigation, 1 ILL. L. REV. 1, 12 (2010) (“[I]t is not unusual for
legal advocates to agree to trial-like procedures for discovery, even to the extent of employing standard civil
procedural rules”).
328
Seldin v. Est. of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185, 212, 939 N.W.2d 768, 790 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2622,
209 L. Ed. 2d 751 (2021)
329
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011).
330
An order in the trial court could be entered along the following lines: “This matter is before the court on
applicant’s motion to vacate an arbitration award and, after giving consideration to the motion, the court finds
the arguments presented by petitioner to be frivolous under the applicable standard of review and the motion is
thus denied.” On appeal, the courts could follow the example of the Fourth Circuit in Acceleration Acad., LLC v.
Charleston Acceleration Acad., Inc., No. 20-1621, 2021 WL 2182983, at *1 (4th Cir. May 28, 2021) (unpublished
summary opinion perfunctorily rejecting challenges two weeks after the submission date).
331
Courts “are neither entitled nor encouraged simply to ‘rubber stamp’ the interpretations and decisions of
arbitrators.” Matteson v. Ryder Sys. Inc., 99 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1996); State v. Henderson, 277 Neb. 240,
265, 762 N.W.2d 1, 18 (2009) (“[A]lthough arbitration decisions are given great deference, they are not
sacrosanct”); see also Westfield Ins. Co. v. Sheehan Constr. Co., 564 F.3d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 2009) (applying
Indiana law) (“How can [a party] exhibit ‘bad faith’ by taking a position that . . . is endorsed by a district judge?”).
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A fear of judicial retribution by those contemplating post-arbitration relief332 can
impact the important role of the judiciary. It can result, for example, in courts losing visibility
and vital knowledge of activities taking place behind closed doors in private tribunals in their
jurisdiction.333 If the arbitration review process is not resuscitated by the Supreme Court, this
could mean hospice care for the justice system in the long run, well after the COVID pandemic
finally subsides.
An arbitrator should know any improper conduct will always be subject to a close
review by the judiciary. As one court bluntly noted, an arbitrator is “subject to some judicial
oversight” and does not “sit as King.”334 This is presumably true even if the arbitrator is the
Tiger King.335

332

An Eleventh Circuit panel decision in B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 913-14
(11th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., LLC, 604 F.3d 1313, 1321
(11th Cir. 2010), is often cited to repeat the panel’s view of becoming “exasperated by those who attempt to
salvage arbitration losses through litigation that has no sound basis in the law applicable to arbitration awards.”
Id. at 914. Hercules Steel arguably has led to unintended consequences. In Hill v. CAG2 of Tuscaloosa, LLC,
No. 7:19-CV-02044-LSC, 2020 WL 3207615, at *4 (N.D. Ala. June 15, 2020), a district court, obliged to follow
Hercules Steel, ordered sanctions against a party in part for arguing “manifest disregard of the law” after Hall
Street, even though the Supreme Court had expressly stated such a challenge remains an open question. StoltNielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. at 672 n.3 (2010) (“We do not decide whether ‘manifest
disregard’ survives our decision in [Hall Street]”).
333
See generally Nebraska Judicial Branch, Supreme Court Oral Argument Archive, available at
https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/courts/supreme-court/oral-argument-archive.
334
State Sys. Of Higher Ed. v. State College, 743 A.2d 405, 411, 560 Pa. 135, 145 (Pa. 1999) (“Yet, the Court
also recognized that the arbitrator’s actions are subject to some judicial oversight. An arbitrator does not sit as
King”).
335
Christopher Palmeri & Lucas Shaw, Netflix’s Quirky ‘Tiger King’ Becomes Breakout Pandemic Hit,
BLOOMBERG (April 8, 2020, 11:16 AM) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-08/netflix-squirky-tiger-king-becomes-breakout-pandemic-hit (“‘Tiger King,’ the Netflix Inc. documentary about a big-cat
trainer who goes by the name of Joe Exotic, has become the runaway hit of the global pandemic”).
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